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I- IH1B0D0C TI0N
following World Mar II, American industry moved into an
era cf interest in organizational development, human
resource management, and executive development. The Armed
Services were often cited as excellent examples of organiza-
tion and structure. Table I lists characteristics of an
effective ciganizaticn which junior officers are encouraged
to inculcate into their management techniques [fief. 1] and
were often cited as responsible for the effective and
efficient organization system of the Armed Forces [fief. 2].
In years gone by, these characteristics of organization
were set in stone in the 0.5. Navy. The Captain of a ship
carried out the missions assigned by delegating responsibil-
ities and authority to his Executive Officer and department
heads. Seamen requested considerations and provided informa-
tion to the command by working through the petty officers.
Chief Petty Officers received orders from, made reports to,
and shared responsibilities with division officers.
In 1S70, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt initiated a Chief Eetty
Officer Advisory Board via his naval message "Z-Gram" number
23. The purpose of the board was to' provide recommendations
and act as a sounding board on ideas and policy proposals of
interest to the enlisted Navyman. In July 1971, acting on
the recommendations cf the Chief Petty Officer Eoard
,
Admiral Zumwalt initiated the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command (MCPOC) program in an effort to " stimulate a
meaningful dialogue among all levels of command and to
enhance command sensitivity to the needs of all enlisted
TABLE I
Excerpt fica Division Officers Guide
Principles of Organization
1. Every job giver your division, every duty for which
your division is responsible, mast be assigned to
cne cr more of your men,
2- All the responsibilities assigned to your men must
be clear cut and well understood by them.
3. Nc specific responsibility should be assigned tc
mere than one person.
4. Each member of the organization, from top to bottom,
should know tc whom he reports and who reports
tc him.
5. Bespcnsibility must he matched by authority and
accountability.
6. Dc net have tec many men report to one leader.
7. Exercise contrcl on your proper level.
8. Divide the work load fairly among your subordinates.
£Bef. 1]
personnel. " He further stated his desire to " ensure open
and active lines cf communications between (enlisted
personnel) and (himselfJ." (Zumwalt, 1971)
One must assume that Admiral Zumwalt precerved a commu-
nications gap between himself and the enlisted community.
Balancing this assumption against the background of the
early 1S70 , s and incidents aboard the Kitty Hawk and
Constellation, one would feel guite safe in saying that
there mest probably was a significant communications gap
between the CNO, Commanders, and Commanding Officers and the
young enlisted personnel of the time. To close the gap, a
10
new fcraal structure has initiated. Clearly Admiral Zumwalt
and his successors have restructured the chain cf ccmmand
for the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, but have
they not also restructured that chain of command for all
hands? The function and position of the Master Chief Petty
Officer cf the Command has teen further defined and broa-
dened by subsequent action and instruction. According to the
most recent instruction, his responsibilities now include a
broad spectrum of comuand-wide issues and interests.
( Excerpts of the OPNAVINST are provided in Appendix A. )
With the rebirth of "Pride and Professionalism" and the
general shift of the United States military to many of the
elder, mere authoritarian or classical traditions, there has
been a swing away frcm many of the initiatives of Admiral
Zumwalt. Why, then, has the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Ccmmand program net been shelved along Mith the "Upward
Seminars" and suit-stvle uniforms? Indeed, why is the Master
Chief Petty Officer cf the Command enjoying ever-increasing
recognition and sponsorship among senior officers? The
purpese of this study is to provide Flag-level officers with
a previously unarticulated package of possible problems
regarding this very ccpular program.
As part of this study, the author conducted a survey
(copy provided in Appendix C) of 824 personnel assigned to
twenty commands within the surface forces of the U. S.
Atlantic Fleet (NAVSUEFLANT) . Personnel represented a cress
section cf afloat commands from the service, amphibious, and
cruiser-destroyer communities within NAVSURFLANT. Ihe
author also conducted approximately 35 individual unstruc-
tured interviews with senior officers, Commanding Officers
of ships. Command Master Chief Petty Officers, and junior
officers. Appendix D provides a list of all commands
participating in either the survey or interviews. Ihe
information provided by the survey proved to be difficult to
1 1
interpret and regression analysis showed no significant
correlations between rank (or tiliet) and choice of answers.
The data is presented in Appendix E with answers to
Questions 6 through 41 crosstabulated by billet. While the
data is not conclusive or statistically significant, the
author dees refer tc patterns of possible interest in the
discussions on orgarizational perspectives which fcllcw.
The interviews proved to be very valuable in obtaining view-
points cf the program. The dialogue summaries provided in
Appendix B are representative of the comments obtained
overall. The majority of the senior officers interviewed
expressed ar overall positive opinion of the program. A few
expressed very strong approval and recommended expansion of
the program while, on the other extreme, a few expressed the
opinion that the program was wasteful use of expensive
talent and should be cancelled. The great majority cf the
commanding officers felt that they should be allowed to pick
their own Command Chief and that it should be a collateral
duty except on very large ships. Again, the author does not
explicitly incorporate the interviews into the paper,
however the information and viewpoints were of great value
and strongly affected the direction of the paper.
The paper is organized into four main chapters, each of
which attempts to diagnose the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command program from an organizational effectiveness
viewpoint using four different perspectives or aspects.
These perspectives are: structural, (emphasizing who
reports tc khom, respcsibility , authority, etc.) political,
(emphasizing power and coalition) symnolic, (emphasizing the
symbols associated kith the program) and human resource
(emphasizing the impact of the program on the individuals
who make up the Navy). The final chapter is a summary of
the author's conclusions and recommendations.
12





CEO Chief Petty Officer
Eept/DH Department Head
Div Cff Eivision Officer
Eng Engineering Department Head
JC Junior Officer
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Ops Operations Department Head
S.E.A. Senior Enlisted Advisor ( forerunner
of the MCPOC program )
Sup Supply Department Head




Navy Eegulations, Article 0701:
The responsibility of the Commanding Officer for his
command is absolute, ...While he may, at his discre-
tion, and when net contrary to law or regulations,
delegate authority to his subordinates for the
execution of details, such delegations of authority
shall in no way relieve the Commanding Officer of
his continued responsibility for the safety, well-
being, and efficiency of his entire command.
A. EEIEGASJON
The above guotation, taken from Navy Regulations,
describes in a few hords the unigue situation faced by a
Commanding Officer of a naval ship. He is personally neld
responsible and accountable for the well-being and perform-
ance of his crew- ihile the Commanding Officer is respon-
sible, he must, in practice, delegate tasks to his
subordinates. Delegation may be defined as the assignment
of authority and responsibility to another person for the
carrying out of activities. The delegation of authority by
Commanding Officers is obviously necessary for the efficient
functioning of the ship since no Commanding Officer can
completely supervise or accomplish every task. The degree
to which any Commanding Officer will delegate is influenced
by many factors, such as the specific task involved, his
personal management style, and the inter -relationships,
personalities, and capabilities of the personnel. These are
"contingency" factors which each Commanding Officer will
take into account in deciding how much to delegate. There
14
are also seme generally accented guidelines for effective
delegation. Responsibility for a task should be assigned to
the lowest level of the organization at which there can be
found sufficient ability and information to carry out that
task- for example, it would obviously be a waste of the
Commanding Officer's time for him to remain in radio central
screening all message traffic in order to read messages of
interest to him. Ee has delegated this responsibility to
radicaen via the chain of command. Should an important
message be lost, the Commanding Officer will held the
communications officer accountable.
A corollary to -this rule is that for individuals to
perform their assigned tasks, they must be delegated suffi-
cient authority. The communications officer in the example
above must be able tc determine training requirements, qual-
ification requirements, and numerous other factors which
will enable his division to effectively operate the communi-
cations guard. By accepting responsibility and authority,
the communications officer has also agreed to accept credit
cr blame for the performance of his division. As a manager,
the cemmunications officer accepts accountability, not orly
for his performance, but for that of his subordinates.
She scalar principle of the classical "top to bottom"
view of authority suggests that for delegation to work
effectively, members of an organization must know where they
stand in the chain of command. This clear definition of the
lines of authority enable personnel to understand tc whom
they nay delegate, who may delegate to them, and tc whom
they are accountable. This "cleanness" of delegation tends
to prevent the existence of gaps, splits, and overlaps.
Gaps occur when a task is not assigned. The unassigned task
will either remain unperformed or will be performed by a
person who views the task as an "extra" burden. Splits
15
cccur when cne task is divided and assigned to two organiza-
tional units. Overlaps occur when the same task (as a
whole) is assigned tc more than one person. With splits and
overlaps, confusion of authority and accountability becomes
probable.
There are two significant harriers to delegation:
1) reluctance to delegate and 2) reluctance to accept dele-
gation. Ihere are many reasons why managers prefer net to
delegate in any given situation: "I can do it tetter
myself"; " Ihe younger managers aren't as level-headed as
they should he"* "If they don't handle it right, the whole
organization could suffer." The major factor preventing
delegation is insecurity. Managers are accountable for the
performance of their subordinates. Additional factors
preventing delegation include lack of managerial ability to
effectively delegate and lack of confidence in subordinates.
Ihe reasons that subordinates are reluctant to accept dele-
gation parallel those of the manager. The subordinate may
be insecure and prefer that the boss make all the decisions-
Ihe fear of criticism or personal fear of failure may also
encourage the subordinate to avoid acceptance of delegated
responsibility. The degree to which an organization
delegates effectively characterizes that organization as
centralized or decentralized. Ernest Dale (1967) described
recentralization as a temporary curtailment of the power of
subordinate levels of management brought about by recession
or difficulties. Luring periods of recentralization,
managers will more closely scrutinize subordinates to
prevent mistakes which will tend to be more costly because
of the environmental situation.
During the early 1970' s there were numerous indications
(USS Kitty Hawk, USS Constellation, and increased shiptoard
sabotage ) that the traditional chain of command had failed
to effectively manage the personnel problems of the day. In
16
an effort tc resolve these problems and reduce the likeli-
hood of future failures to communicate, Admiral Zunwalt
initiated the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
program. figures 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate the typical ship-
hoard formal structure before and after the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command program. In the shiptoard
structure refore the implementation of the program,
perscnrel matters were delegated to the various levels of
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figure 2.1 S1B0CT0BAI DELEGATION; PBE-MCPOC.
The Navy allows the Commanding Officer to hold his chain of
command accountable for personnel matters. The Commanding
Officer grants his chain of command the authority and
17
responsitility of appropriately deciding which personnel
matters warrant his attention and which can be resolved at a
lower level.
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Figure 2.2 BICENTB1LIZED STEOCIUHE:POST-MCPCC.
With the introductioc of the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command, the Navy has directed the Commanding Officer
not tc rely solely upon the chain of command to properly
filter the personnel information. The Commanding Officer
will cow receive iifcrmation filtered only by the Master
Chief Petty Officer of the Ccmmand. The Commanding Officer
and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command are now the
officials deciding at what level the matter should be
resolved. Indeed, the r ecentralization occurs atove the
ship/unit level. Ihe Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command is responsible to keep not only the Commanding
Officer tut also the sguadrcn or group Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command advised of matters of significance to
the enlisted community.
18
B. DIVISION VS. FOHCTIOHAL SIBOCTOfiE
Closely related to the question of delegation is the
issue of design of organizational structure. Modern organi-
zations are organized into two basic designs of structure,
functional or divisional. There is a third design which has
become very common tut is really a combination of the two.
The- matrix structure attempts to combine the benefits of
divisional and functional designs. A divisional design
groups together into a given subunit, all of the activities,
skills, expertise, and assets required to produce and/or
market seme organizational product. With this unity of
assets, it is much easier and faster to coordinate all
necessary activities. Accountability for organizational
goals is clear. A functionally designed organization groups
together into a given subunit, all of the assets of a
certain type to be redistributed to various organization
activities for use. With the functional design the organi-
zation can improve supervision, since managers will have to
he expert in only a narrow range of skills. It will be
easier to activate certain specialized skills and bring
these to bear on possible trouble spots. The major disad-
vantages of functional design is that coordination between
different functional areas must take place at a much higher
(and often remote) echelon cf management. Figures 2.3
and2.4 depict the design impact of the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command program.
The tasic design for shipboard organization is essen-
tially a functional structure. If the Weapons Officer can
not maintain the guns in an operating condition, he will be
held accountable. If he can not account for the funds used
by his department, te will be held accountable. If he can
not motivate his personnel to apply their efforts to the
ship's gcals, he will be held accountable.
19
figure 2.3 DIVISIONAL STBUCTUBE: PBE-MCPOC.
In the post-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
design, the shipboard organization is essentially unchanged
with one exception. There is now a functional line
authority for enlisted personnel matters. While the divi-
sion leaders (department heads) had previously exercised
sole authority over enlisted personnel within their depart-
ment, new an authority completely separate from their cwn
has functional authority for enlisted matters.
C. SPAN 01 SDPERVISICH
Span of supervision refers to the number of subordinates
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Figure 2-4 JOiCTIOMAI STHUCTOBE: POST-MCPCC.
noted the need for different spans at different levels
within the organization. Each foreman, for example, who is
dealing with fairly simple tasks, may supervise twenty or
thirtv workers, while each superintendent may only supervise
three cr four foremen. £ Bef . 3 ] In selecting the correct
span, managers must consider net only the direct relation-
ships with the supervised people but also the numerous
combinations of relationships among all of those supervised.
Ihe choice of the appropriate span of supervision is
important because it affects the efficient utilization of
toth the manager and his subordinates and because it affects
the design of the structure. loo wide a span will encourage
overexteiding managers, underutilizing subordinates, and
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preventing sufficient communications and interpersonal time
between the manager and at least some of his subordinates,
loo narrow a span of supervision will underutilize the
manager, overextend tie subordinate, and encourage excessive
manager-subordinate interaction. Again referring to Figure
2.3, pre-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command structure
gave the Ccamanding Cfficer a "primary" span of supervision
ever the Executive Officer and department heads. With the
Master Chief Petty Cfficer of the Command, the span of
supervision has increased, admittedly by only one, hut a
very important one in terms of time and effort allocated to
interpersonal relationships and communications. The
Commanding Officer must now spend many hours discussing the
individual problems or concerns of his entire enlisted
complement. The Connanding Officer will listen to matters
which ought to be (and maybe have been) solved at lower
levels of supervision. This implies that he will spend a
great deal of time with the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command; possibly to the detriment of his ether
immediate or close subordinates.
D- £011 MANAGEMENT
Leaders face two separate functional demands which have
teen labelled as "task specialization/social specializa-
tion," (Bales, 19 58); "concern for people/concern for
production," (Blake and Mouton, 1964); "task orientation/
relationship orientation," (Eiedler, 1967); and "task
behavior/relationship behavior," (Hersey and Blanchard,
1972). Amitai Etzicni ( 1959 ) advocated the use of dual
management in complex organizations. According to
dual-management theories, individuals with strong task
oriented styles of leadership tend to do well in task
oriented situations. This manager will apply whatever
22
assets axe necessary to successfully complete a given job.
Because of his strong desire to get the job done, the task
oriented leader will not give appropriate consideration to
the needs of employees. Because he will be preceived as
uncaring by his subordinates, the task leader will not make
a good councilor. His subordinates will not trust their
needs tc this leader because the needs will not receive
sufficient consideration. Since the task leader is net tcld
about these needs, he will continue to focus his attention
on the task, ignoring the nurturing aspects of leadership.
Likewise, the pecple-oriented manager, when faced with a
given situation, will resolve any guestions based on the
impact they may have en the well-being of his subordinates.
As tasks build up and employees are burdened to an ever
increasing extent, the relationship manager will devote more
and mere effort to resolving the increasing personnel prob-
lems- [Bef. 4] In each of the scenarios above, the manager
is faced with the task of balancing separate and possibly
opposing requirements. Recent theories suggest that every
manager has both orientations to some degree. Each conflict
that arises must be resolved based on the strength of the
particular manager's orientations. There are, however,
additional conflicts that arise besides that of task versus
relationship. Several studies have identified several types
of conflict common in almost all organizations: £Eef. 5]
1. Intrasender conflict occurs when a single
supervisor presents a subordinate with an
incompatible set of orders or expectations.
2. Intersender conflict arises when orders
or expectations from one person or group
oppose the expectations from another person
or group.
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3. Inter-role conflict occurs when the
different roles flayed by the same person
give rise tc conflicting demands.
4. Person^role conflict occurs when job role
requirements run counter to the individual's
needs or values.
5. Role overload conflict occurs when the
individual is confronted with orders and
expectations which cannot be completed within
the given limits.
6. Role ambiguity occurs when the individual
is provided with insufficient or unclear
information about his responsibilities.
The effects of these conflicts on organizations and individ-
uals is fcell documented. Role conflict and ambiguity causes
decreased job satisfaction and increased anxiety. Ambiguity
and inconsistency raises the anxiety of subordinates, causes
less favorable attitudes towards supervision, and lowers
productivity. [ Ref • 6] John Senger recognized the existance
cf this role conflict and ambiguity problem in the U. S.
Navy and attempted to document the manner in which the
conflict was resolved aboard ships- Senger theorized that
the social and task functions were divided between the
Commanding Officer and Executive Officer. He encouraged
industry to return to the concept of "assistant-to-the-
president" in order tc have a second-in-command available to
facilitate the sharing of the social and task functions.
The main point here is that the dual management recommended
24
fcy Senger is shared tetween the top two figures with line
authority. [Ref. 7]
In the pre-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Ccmmand
Navy, the cnly individual specifically tasked to see to the
social and emotional needs of the enlisted personnel was the
Commanding Cfficer. How he accomplished this function was
through his chain of command, with a couple of safety valves
(i.e. the Chaplain cr the Commanding Officer's open-door
policy). In every decision, the Commanding Officer had to
weigh the factors of task requirement and social impact. In
turn each of his sutcrdinates had to balance these factors
at a subordinate level. Sometimes the overall situation
made it easy to balance the demands. More often, however,
the demands created seme degree of conflict. The conflict
was normally identified at the junior management level. lor
example, the Chief Eetty Officer would tell the division
officer that task demands (paint chipping) were not reccn-
cilarle with the social needs (well deserved liberty) of the
men. The division officer would either 1) pass the conflict
to the department head, 2) make a decision in favor of
either task or social requirements and accept the conse-
quences, or 3) resolve the conflict in terms of some degree
cf compromise. This basic scenario can be applied to every
aspect of the organi2ational and individual needs inherent
aboard ships. The Chief Petty Officer of a division must
continuously weigh the requirements for training, cleaning,
maintenance, operaticn, socialization, individual fulfill-
ment, recognition, reward, sense of belonging, and many
ethers.
With the introduction of the Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Ccmnand program, the dual management idea takes on
new meaning. The Commanding Cfficer (and Executive Officer
depending en the individual arrangements) must still under-
stand and resolve the conflicts of task and social-emotional
needs of the ship. However, below the Commanding
25
Of ficer/Fxecutive Officer level, the conflict is resolved
via a structural change in the organization. The Commanding
Officer and Executive Officer will without fail, delegate
the task requirements to the chain of command- However, in
a numrer of areas (as highlighted by Section C of CPNAVINST
5400. 37CJ the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer will
delegate the social-emotional needs to the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command. The results of the senior
officer interviews supports this theory. It is a wide
spread practice to have the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Ccnmand "supervise" or "run" the retention team, the
awards hoard, the Sailor of the Month program, Family
Services programs, aid even the NJP review process. While
almost every Master Chief Petty Officer of the Ccmmand
conducted these programs "through the chain of ccmmand,"
very few stated that they routinely worked with the division
officers or department heads. Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Ccumand generally took care of these "enlisted matters"
by working with the Chief Petty Officers. Figures 2. 5 and
2.6 demonstrate the inpact of the Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Ccmmand program in terms of dual management. The
pre-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command diagram shews
every ectelon of the chain of command sharing the burden of
role conflict.
The post-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Ccmmand
diagram shows the task and social requirements being sepa-
rated at the Commanding Officer/Executive Officer level and
to a limited degree ccming together again at the Chief Petty
Officer level. Additional discussion on the role conflict
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Figure 2.6 DUAL IEADEBSHIP STRUCTURE: POST-MCPOC.
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Ill- POLIIICAI PEBSPECTIVE
Good Managers. .. are tie keys to an organization's success.
are rot motivated by a need for personal
aggrandizement, or by a need to get aicng
Kith subordinates, bat rather by a need to





Ihe rather small amount of scholarly writing regarding
power in organizations prior to the last decade indicates
that this aspect or organizational reality was not well
recognized. The quantity and diversity of the writings in
recent years indicate that power is not well understood.
Power is not tangible. You can not show it en an organiza-
tional chart. It is not easily measured by survey or inter-
view. It aay not be identified even over long periods of
casual observation. Observed or not, it can be felt by all
who have it and all who yield to it. Definitions of power
vary among theorists. Generally, they agree that power is
the ability of one person (or group) to influence the
actions or beliefs of another person (or group). Some theo-
rists qualify the definition ty adding that the actions or
29
beliefs influenced wculd not otherwise have been taken or
accepted; that the action is directed to desired outcomes;
that power must be exercised to be present; or conversely
that power does not have to be exercised to be present.
£Bef. 9] For the purpose of this project, the author will
use the following definition of power:
Ihe anility (or potential) for one individual (or
group) to influence the actions of another indi-
vidual or group in a direction desired by the holder
cf power.
Authority is often used synonymously with power. While
these concepts are closely related, an understanding cf the
difference between tiem is critical to an understanding of
the political perspective of an organization. Authority is
more structured and restricted than power. Authority can be
used to influence others therefore, (in keeping with the
definition above) it is a subset of power. Authority is
generally vested in organizational positions and is trans-
ferred guid pro guo with succession of incumbents.
finally, before discussing the political perspective of
an organization, the term "politics 11 must be understood.
Politics in the context of organizational reality does not
necessarily involve kissing babies and making speeches as is
normally attributed to the public arena. Organizational
politics involves activities to gain, expand and utilize
power which, coupled with other resources, is employed to
influence the activities of the organization in the
preferred direction cf the power holders. £Bef. 10]
E. SCOBCES OF OBG AHIZATIOM AL EOHEB
Assuming that individuals or groups in an organization
will want to influence others in the direction of
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organizational goals, it becomes critical to understand hho
can obtain power, how they can obtain power, from whom they
can ottain cower, and over whom they can exercise power. In
turn, one must be able to identify the source (s) of power in
that organization.
J. £. P. French and B. Baven have provided what is
probarly the most widely known theory of the sources of
power. They identified six categories of sources:
£Ref. 11]
1. Coerci ve P_ower is based on the follower's perception
that the power holder can punish him. The punishment can
take many forms including: reduction in pay, suspension,
termination, demotion, incarceration, etc. The punishment
will be unpleasant and deny or reduce the follower of cne or
more of his preceived needs.
2. Beward power is based on the follower's perception
that the power holder can reward him. The reward car also
take many forms including: increased salary, improved work
conditicrs, recognition, additional recreation time, promo-
tion, etc. The reward will be pleasant and help fulfill or
increase one or more cf his preceived needs.
3. Exp ert p ower is based upon the followers belief that
the pcwer holder has special knowledge or expertise which
can be used to meet the preceived needs of the fcllcwer.
For example, if a car owner can not repair his automobile
engine, the local mechanic will enjoy power over the car
owner. The power will be wielded to command monetary
remuneration.
<4. Beferent power is based on the follower's desire to
identify with a charismatic or respected person. The char-
ismatic person holds power over the follower to the extent
that he can influence the follower's actions in return for
the "privilege" of continued association. John F. Kennedy
is certainly the most famous example of referent power tut
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referent power is also commcn place. Youngsters are often
influenced to act cut of character because of the referent
power exercised by playmates.
5. Eepresentative powe r is given to a person fcy another
perscn cr group with an implied agreement that the
"followers" will continue to follow as long as the power
holder stays within certain guidelines of group desires.
The foreman of a jtry is granted representative power by
fellow jurors. He will retain this power as long as he
stays withir the general guidelines of the group desires
(i.e. majority rule, and anonymity).
6- leg itimate po wer is based upon the follower's values
which convince him that the power holder has a legitimate
"right" to influence and that the follower is "bound" to
accept. Legitimate power is the basis of the subset called
authority. Emergency vehicles exercise legitimate power
when they influence vehicles to pull over to the right hand
side cf the road. Automobile drivers do so because they
know that it is the "right" thing to do.
A person may be able to influence another based en any
one of the conditions listed above, or any combination of
the bases. In organizations, management frequently exhibits
power characteristic of several of the bases. Power
acquired from one base augments and stablizes power acquired
from ether bases. A corporate executive has power because
employees telieve it to be right for him to have power
(legitimate) ; because he can hire, fire, and promote (reward
and coercive); because he can give them inside information
about corporate matters (expert) ; because they would like to
be associated as being a part of his team (referrent) ; and
because he can engage in activities which will increase
profits or some other measure of corporate well-being
(representative). Individuals will obviously be influenced
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more cr less on different types of power depending on their
relationship with the power holder-
Rcsabeth Kanter has expanded on the French and Eaven
power source theory. She adds two additional or special
sources cf power which apply in an organizational context
rather than an interpersonal situation- These
organizational sources are: activities and alliances.
Activi tes as power source can be categorized into three
rasic types. Extraordinary activities are those engaged in
for the first time, such as filling a new position, espe-
cially if the position is located in the higher levels of
the management hierarchy. Involvement in organizational
changes, either structural or personnel and participation in
activities which involve personal or organizational risks
will increase the power base of the employee. Visible
activities increase an employee's power base by attracting
attention or notice to what contributions the employee makes
to the organization, thereby increasing the preceived depen-
dence upon that employee. Visibility will actually serve as
a multiplier cr enhancer of other power bases. Relevant
activities closely parallels visible and extraordinary
activities- If an employee is engaged in activities which
top management believes are "crucial" to the organization's
well-being, the employee will enjoy extraordinary visibility
and increased status and power. Ranter's activities
concepts will be better understood after discussion on the
power and dependency concept in the next section-
The second organizational source of power identified by
Kanter is alliance s. Alliances allow employees to peel or
share power with fellow employees. Alliances can be estab-
lished with peers, subordinates, or seniors. Alliances with
peers can increase the ability one has to influence
resources cf an organization towards desired goals. Peer
support will reduce the degree of dependence one has on
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seniors cr subordinates especially in meeting one's needs
for affiliation and esteem. Alliances with subordinates
enables one to extend his influence via the alliance
network. Subordinates can improve the resources available
to an allied boss fcr the execution of his tasks, again
reducing his dependence on other sources. The greatest
power enhancer is probably the third category of alliance,
the alliance with a senior in the organizational hierarchy.
An allied senior can provide significant information,
visibility, and status.
A significant amount of power is available to the higher
management levels of an organization. Managerial power is
no different from power existing in any other relationship
in so far as the sources of that power. However, it may be
helpful tc discuss managerial power in four general
categories: [fief- 9]
1 • form al p osit ional powers exist as the legitimate
rights, responsibilities, and perogatives granted to
managers. The} are held responsible for many aspects
of the organization therefore, they will have appro-
priately broad authority.
2- Resourc es can be used by management to reward or
punish, increase or decrease dependence, and to
improve the status of the pro ject/workcenter or of a
particular individual or group of individuals.
•3- Cont rol of decision premises enables managers to
place contraints on the decisions made at lower
levels. Not only the amount of decision premises
controlled but the timing of the release of these
premises can empower subordinates. Control of infor-
mation is a special case of control of decision prem-
ises. Communications is the key to any organization.
If there is no information flow, there is no organi-
zation. Information comes into the organization from
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the environment. It is transmitted within the orga-
nization in numerous formal and informal ways- 2he
mere information relevant to the functioning of the
organization that any single member has, the more
cower he will have within that organization.
**- Experience is the common term referred to in identi-
fying a key trait of a successful manager.
Experience is, in reality, the acknowledged opportu-
nity an individual has had to obtain expertise,
legitimacy, broad information, and many other assets
which enhance power.
£Bef. 12]
Cne flaw in the french and Eaven theory is the implicit
treatiient cf power as an attribute of a person or as a
static relationship between individuals. Personal traits,
skills, positions, or expertise which may be relevant in one
relationship may not be relevant in another. Likewise,
within a given relationship, the relevance of a base of
power in one situation may he entirely independent of the
relevance cf that base of power in another situation.
C. J3IPEBDENCE AID PCiEB
Eelaticnships in every facet of social interaction are
determined by mutual dependence. If there is absolutely no
mutual dependence between individuals, they have no rela-
tionship and they exercise no influence on each other. Ihe
mutual dependence does not have to be significant to support
a relationship. Two strangers entering an elevator are
mutually dependent tc the degree that the individuals want
to be in a polite environment. The presence of the ether
passenger will influence each to abstain from "rude"
hehavior. Each passenger is in a position, to some degree,
to grant or deny, facilitate or hinder, the others wish.
Power to influence the other is based upon the control over
that which he values (environment). [fief. 13]
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Two variables function jointly to determine the depen-
dence that one perscn will have upon another. The depen-
dence of one person en another will increase" proportionately
with an increase in tie importance of the needs met in that
relationship. For example, a "casual" marijuana user will
show very little dependence on a dealer while a heroin
addict will show great dependence on his pusher. Dependence
will decrease proportionately with an increase in the avail-
ability cf ether sources of need satisfaction. Continuing
with the example above, if the heroin addict discovers ether
pushers willing to support his habit, his dependence on the
original pusher is diminished-
Power can now be defined as the amount of resistance on
the part of the follower which can be potentially cverccme
by the power holder tecause of the follower's dependence.
This power does not have to be exercised to be present,
flhen exercised, the power is not limited to the object of
dependence. In the drug example, the sole supplier of hecin
can influence the addict in matters of theft, prostitution,
or numerous other "unrelated" aspects of the addict's
behavior.
An important aspect of dependency based power is that
one perscn does not have to be independent (or even less
dependent) of the ether in order to have power over that
person. The obvious example is that of a marriage.
Although the dependence may be perfectly mutual, each spouse
has power to influence the other under various circum-
stances. Power is present but it is balanced at equal
levels. Another possible situation could exist if cne
person enjoyed a power advantage over another. This situ-
ation can also exist in a perfectly satisfactory and
balanced relationship. For example, in a romantic relation-
ship, one person might have a much higher need for the
affiliation provided in the relationship and therefore nave
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a greater dependence en the other person- The less depen-
dent partner will exercise a power advantage over the more
dependent. This relationship will remain in .balance
however, as long as the power advantage/disadvantage is
proportionate to the independence/dependence relationship.
When the power advantage is exercised, the more dependent
partner aaj find that relationship unacceptable in its
present form. four changes in the relationship can occur
which will bring the power hack into balance:
1 . The nore dependent partner can devalue those needs
met by the otter, thereby reducing his dependency.
2. The more dependent partner can devalue the needs
causing his resistance to the other therby negating
the need to exercise power.
3- The less dependent partner can increase the value of
his needs met by the other thereby reducing the power
advantage.
4. Ihe less dependent partner can devalue his own needs
(for which he was exercising power) therehy negating
the need to exercise power.
C. FCiEE AND MAHAGEiJIHT
The guotation at the beginning of this chapter states
the necessity to give adequate attention to the power moti-
vations of managers. Reducing that guotation somewhat makes
the case even harder:
Good managers are the keys to an organization's
success (and they) want power.
John Atkinson (1964) proposed a model of motivation based on
the principle that adults apply their potential capabilities
depending on their relative strengths in three basic drives:
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The need for achievement motivates people to do things
themselves; the desire to do something better or more effi-
ciently than others can do it. This motivation will seek
concrete, short-term feedback.
The need for affiliati on motivates people to estatlish
and nurture positive relationships with others. This moti-
vation will seek comfortable processes and a safe and secure
envircrment. The person motivated by affiliation needs
makes a good "team player."
The final motivation identified by Atkinson is the power
motivation. Power notivaticn is the desire to influence
ethers. Unlike the achievement motivated person, the power
motivation does not seek success in completing a task.
Power motivation is aimed at getting a task complete, tut
not tv one's own effcrt.
[fief- 14]
In a study of American management motivation, managers
participating in management workshops were categorized by
their motivation drives and their relative success as judged
by their seniors and peers. The conclusion was that
managers will possess a high need for power. This need must
be disciplined and directed toward the benefit of the orga-
nization rather than the personal aggrandizement of the
manager- This need for power must be greater than the
manager 1 s need to be liked. The successful manager should
influence ethers 1 successes more than achieve new goals
himself or socialize with his subordinates. In this study,
conducted by David McClelland and associates, not only *as
power motivation in managers found to be more important than
affiliation in determining the organization's success,
achievement needs were also found to be more critical than
affiliation needs. The dominance of power motivation over
affiliation motivation was evident in 80 percent of the
"good" managers as compared to only 10 percent in the poorer
managers. £Eef. 15]
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Gcod managers have a need for power. Where does it come
from? flanagers obtain power from the same power sources as
everyone else. See Table IV helps to summarize the organi-
zational design factors which can enable or limit power
distritution in an organization. The design of positions
(or billets) at every level in the organization is important
because power enables the employee to be productive. This
is critically true for management positions. Managers need
sufficient power and latitude to perform thier jots well.
£Ref. 12] If the distribution of power is not closely
aligned with the distribution of organizational responsibil-
ities, key members will not have sufficient power to execute
their responsibilities and the organization will not be
effective.
E. PCSEB AND THE HASTEB CHIEE OF THE COMMAND
Hhile discussion of political considerations in the
U- S. Navy may sound like heresy to many career Navymen, the
only taboo broken would be the discussion, not the exis-
tence, of political reality in the Navy. Politics has
enabled Admirals to become Chief of Naval Operations. There
is nct-hing inherently wrong with that because the Chiefs of
Naval Operations can use thier power for the good of the
0- S. Navy and American citizens. On a smaller tasis
personnel assigned to ships have the same need for power at
their level. In order to structure the discussion of the
political implications of the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command program, the author has divided shipboard
personnel into five interest groups:
1. Commanding Officer and Executive Officer
2. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
3. Chief Petty Officers
4. Enlisted Persccnel
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5. Junior Officers (including department heads)
While every power source will not be discussed for each
group, these which the author feels are particularly
affected by the progiam will be addressed in the fcllcwing
sections.
1 • Comman ding Officer and Execu t ive O fficer
Ihe Commanding Officer and Executive Officer are
grouped together because these are the two officers aboard a
ship who exercise authority over the entire compliment of
personnel assigned, officer and enlisted. Each Commanding
Officer and Executive Officer will have their own style of
implementing the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
program, and will therefore experience some variations in
the political impact of the program. In general, Commanding
Officers and Executive Officers will act as a top team with
shared interactions regarding the Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Ccmmand and all other matters.
What has been the effect of the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command program on the power of the
Commanding Officer and Executive Officer? Obviously, the
authority or legitimate power basis has not changed. The
expertise of the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer
has net been changed. The power to coerce is still present
and the desire fcr people to be associated with the
Commanding Officer and Executive Officer has probably not
changed. Ihe author, however, feels that many of the ether
power bases may have teen altered.
Ihe Commanding Officer and Executive Officer have
always had the ability to reward personnel assigned to them.
Rewards include; verbal praise letters, medals, increased
promotion livelihood, and assistance in obtaining the best
"next job." Prior to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program, the Commanding Officer and Executive
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Officer relied upon the chain of command to initiate and
sponsor rewards presented to the Commanding Officer and
Executive Officer. The junior managers controlled the
reward activities of the Commanding Officer and Executive
Officer to the degree that they withheld information which
might justify or negate reward considerations. For example,
the Captain wouldtell the leading boatswain's mate that he
did a good job, only when the First Lieutenant or Weapons
Officer had informed him that the sailor was deserving cf
recognition. With the introduction and expansion of the
Waster Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, the
Commanding Officer ard Executive Officer are now much more
capable cf applying rewards independent of the chain cf
command. In some cases they may even be more capable than
the chain cf command supervisors because the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command is not involved in the many
task-related aspects of the job that the chain cf command
managers are. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
can therefore expend significantly more effort in locking
for "rewardable" performance and in the administrative
requirements to make those rewards come to fruitition.
Ihe Commanding Officer (and Executive Officer to a
lesser degree) exhibits representative power when he speaks
for his ship. If an Admiral comes on hoard and the
Commanding Officer says, "We are happy to have you here,"
the crew will support the notion that the Commanding Officer
is speaking for all hands. This power can be lost if the
Commanding Officer overcommits himself. If the Commanding
Officer were to introduce the Admiral and say, "We would
like for you and your staff to arrange for us to serve as
flagship fcr your upcoming deployment," the crew would
disqualify his representation powers by numerous "under-
breath" comments, means, and groans which would tell the
Commanding Officer and the Admiral that the comment was not
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representative of the crew. The Commanding Officer has
always teen able to speak as the representative of his ship
to some degree. With the introduction of the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command, the Commanding Officer has a
direct lick to the enlisted community. Because this link is
present, the Commanding Officer can speaJc "for the crew"
with more credibility. When he approaches the point where
he may threaten his representative power, the possibility
that he really dees have some empirical data to support his
statement may prevent dissenters from voicing their
objections.
Cne of the najor advantages of the Master Chief
Petty Cfficer of the Command program is the alliance which
the Commanding Officer can forn with the Master Chief. Ihe
Commanding Cfficer can speak using not only his legitimate,
expert, and other power; he now speaks with the iaplied
concurrence of the man who*s sole responsibility it is to
watch for the welfare and morale of the enlisted cemmunity.
All hands "know" that the Master Chief represents their best
interest, so if he supports the Commanding Officer's posi-
tion on seme issue, personnel will more readily accept the
position of the Commanding Cfficer. In industry, the same
purpose would be served if Crysler's Lee Iaccoca could
present all policy matters with U.A.W. President lane
Kirkland standing at his side. In the Navy scenario, the
Commanding Cfficer has the best of both worlds; he has the
"employees 1 " representative standing beside him and he knows
that the representative is going to be cooperative and
supportive.
Ihe Executive Officer has the opportunity to form an
alliance of a sonewhat different nature. Since the Master
Chief Petty Officer cf the Command has no task responsirili-
ties and, in accordance with the instruction is to be
involved in most of the "people" programs, the Executive
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Officer can increase the power base of the Master Chief
Pettj Officer of tie Command in excnange for the Master
Chief Petty Officer cf the Command's assistance in many of
the administrative/personnel matters which traditionally
inundate Executive Officers.
Ihe Commanding Officer and Executive Officer used to
rely en the chain of command and informal lices of communi-
cations to obtain all of the information they required to
effectively execute their duties. Likewise, all members of
the cemmand were dependent on the Commanding Officer and
Executive Officer tc provide the guidance and "strategic"
focus upon which the routine operational decisions could be
made. Ihe Commanding Officer and Executive Officer held the
decision premises over all others and the information was
disseminated on a "need to know" basis. With the introduc-
tion of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
program, the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer still
maintain their control of information but they are now
capable cf providing that information to the Chief's mess or
even the mess decks, without involvement of the chain of
command. Figures 2.4 and 2-6 demonstrate these lines of
commun ica tiens.
Ihe impact of the Master Chief Petty Officer cf the
Command program is most obvious when the Commanding Officer
and Executive Office evaluate their dependencies on the
chain cf command before and after the program. Indeed, the
impetus for the original Senior Enlisted Advisor program was
Admiral Zumwalt's desire to reduce his dependence on the
chain cf cemmand for information regarding the enlisted
community. With the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command actively and routinely attending to personnel
matters, the Commanding Officer has the option of reducing
his dependence on the department heads and division offi-
cers. If a particular Chief Petty Officer is not performing
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in a satisfactory maimer, the Commanding Officer can have
the chair cf command address the problem or he can eft to
have the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command address
the problem. The chain of command is no longer the scle
source of management intervention. Therefore, the
Commanding Officer's dependence on the chain is reduced.
2 . Master C bief Petty Officer of the Comman d
The power shift in favor of the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command may seem obvious and precisely as
intended by the sponsors of the program. However, in an
effort to present a complete picture of the political
perspective, the author feels obligated to cover this
aspect- It is important to keep in mind that a great deal
cf power was exercised by the senior enlisted person long
before the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Ccmmand
program. This power was often exercised in informal chan-
nels and was less high-lighted than it is under the new
program but it was most certainly present.
The senior enlisted man of ten years ago had the
ability to restrict liberty, take subordinates to mast via
the chain cf command, and even put in a bad word to the
Commanding Officer. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command cf today meets regularly with the Commanding Officer
and Executive Officer and can discuss any matter which might
affect the enlisted community. The Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command can influence the Commanding Officer
and Executive Officer on matters of reward, resource
allocation, punishment, etc.
The degree to which the Commanding Officer and/or
Executive Officer can be influenced by the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command will define the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command's coercive power- The opportu-
nity to attempt to influence the Commanding Officer and
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Executive Officer is present as it always has been. However,
cow there is little ci no risk involved in the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command's attempt. If he is successful
in his attempt to influence, he can bring significant
punishment to bear. If he is not successful in his attempt,
he is safe from reprisal because he is responsible only to
the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer.
As in coercive power, the Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Ccmmand has reward power in proportion to his ability
to influence the Conmanding Officer and Executive Officer.
Additionally, through his participation and/or chairmanship
of the various personnel boards he can be the key factor in
many awards. He will probably be the primary control point
for tie striker selection board, the Enlisted Surface
Warfare Specialist beard, the Awards board and others.
Enlisted personnel interested in receiving these awards; and
chiefs and officers interested in helping their assigned
personnel in obtaining these awards, will have seme
dependence on the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command.
The expert pewer of the senior enlisted personnel of
the Navy has always been recognized and is increasing as
rapidly as the technical aspects of naval warfare. The
expert power exercised by senior enlisted personnel is
enhanced by the criticality of their rate and relevance of
their ^ot to mission accomplishment. On a guided missile
cruiser, a chief boatswain's mate will exercise seme expert
power tut possibly net a great deal. Place that same chief
aboard an amphibious tank landing ship and his expert power
will te routinely emphasized.
Ihe Master Chief Petty Officer of the Ccmmand may
come may come frcm any rating background. If he serves as a
collateral duty Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command,
he will retain the expert power base associated with his
rate. He will alsc gain additional expert power as the
"authority" on enlisted matters.
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Ihe referent power exercised by the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command is significant. The Commanding
Officer and Executive Officer will want to be associated
with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command on a very
positive basis. This relationship will serve as a symtolic
statement of the Commanding Officer's interest and concern
for the crew. If the Commanding Officer can not establish a
good public image with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command, he could lose a great deal of credibility with
ether enlisted personnel and with his seniors. Other people
on the ship wil also be concerned about having a good
rapport with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command,
fellow Chief Petty Cfficers will enjoy increased status if
they asscciate with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command. Since he is obviously successful and influential
himself, if they are considered one of his "associates,
"
they will gain also. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command enjeys increased power because of this situation.
Ey virtue of OPNAVINST 5400. 37C, the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command is the representative of the
enlisted community. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command is generally given a great deal of representative
power but the power may not be indicative of his true
ability to represent the enlisted community.
One of the most interesting and significant findings
in the analysis of the NAVSOBflANT survey is that the Master
Chief Petty Officer of the Command may be poorly suited to
fulfill the function of enlisted representative. There are
persuasive indications that the Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Command has more in common with the Ccmmanding
Officer ard Executive Officer than with the enlisted
personnel. In fact, the responses to several of the
guestions (presented in Table III)
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** 17 67 17 **
07 07 67 07 13
07 27 19 25 22
TAE1E III
Survey Besults Profile Comparisons
The contents of this table are excerpts from the
survey results provided in Appendix E. The numbers in
each row indicate the percentile breakdown of the groups
indicated- The answers to guestions 1 . 8, and 9 indicate
who the respondents feel would be the Lest official to
handle a particular situation. The answers to guestions
15, 16, and 22 indicate the degree to which respondents
agree or disagree with seme policy or aspect within
their cemmand. Note the relative similarity between
of the percentile spread of Commanding Officers
and HCIGC (s) as compared with other respondents.
Question 7





Obtaining " feel " for crew reaction to policy
Ccnimanding Officer ** ** 99 ** **
MCfCC ** ** 93 07 **
Seamen/Firemen 13 29 40 16 02
Question 9










Appropriateness of junior officer privileges
Commanding Officer ** ** 99 ** **
MCECC 07 07 67 20 **
Division Officer 12 32 48 07 02
Question 22




17 ** 17 17 50
07 ** 29 21 43
** 20 40 15 25
** 17 83 ** **
13 20 60 07 **
03 1 1 57 20 08
40 60 ** ** **
40 33 13 ** 13
06 24 41 17 12
indicate that tie traditional chain of command is more
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likely to understand the needs and motivations of the junior
enlisted man than is the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command. These results are discussed in detail in the human
resources perspective. Regardless of the accurateness of
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command's representa-
tion, he still enjoys significant representative power
because he is the designated representative and unless he
misuses this power, he will be a tie to rely on it.
Any Commanding Officer who has ever commanded
successfully has understood the power and importance of his
senior eilisted man. Every good Commanding Officer makes
the effort to establish seme informal communications with
his key chiefs and others. The Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Command program added a legitimate label to a rela-
tionship which has always been critical. The Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command not only influences the
Commarding Officer outside the chain of command, he dees so
legitimately because cf the program.
The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command activ-
ities are a key ingredient of his power. His attendance at
department head meetings, presence at ceremonies, and
participation in the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command chain of command defines his role in the orgaEiza-
tion as one involved in the "strategic" management of the
organization. The wide variety of activities and the lack
cf any routine reguirements shows people that he is not
confined to operational agendas. The only personnel on
board who demonstrate a wider range of activities are the
Commanding Officer and Executive Officer (and maybe not even
the Executive Officer). Table IV presents a listing of
job design factors and tne way they affect power distribu-
tion . Note that task variety, relation of tasks to current
protlem areas, focus cf tasks, and participation in confer-
ences and meetings add to the power base of the irdividual.
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Ihe asterisk indicate the author's interpretation cf where
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command billet, as




Billet Design Contributions to Power
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with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
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workirg directly with the Commanding Officer and Executive
Officer, he has an excellent opportunity to form alliances
with these officers. He has the opportunity to form other
alliances with department heads, division officers, chief
petty officers, and the enitre crew. Most likely, however,
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is going to
most closely align with the Commanding Officer and his
fellow Chief Petty Officers. There are excellent reasons
for this alliance preference.
1. The Commanding Officer is most likely the man closest
in age and experience (length of service) to the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command.
2. Beth men are more likely than others to have obtained
the positions for which they had set goals in their
early adult years.
3. Beth men are essentially free from peer competition
en beard their unit.
4. Beth men are beyond the administrative, mundane, and
routine aspects of management.
As demonstrated by Talle III, the results of the
C0MNAVSUEJ1MT survey strongly indicate an alliance of
interests and opiniens between the Commanding Officer ard
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. While the
results listed in the table are not statistically signifi-
cant, the author believes that, they do indicate a closeness
of beliefs and opinions between Commanding Officers and
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Commands which supports
their alliance formation.
respite the troad interests and activities assigned
to the Master Chief fetty Officer of the Command, directives
do not specifically assign any personnel resources for his
control. In reality, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command draws whatever resources he may require from
personnel assigned to divisions.
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The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
obtains information from all levels: the Commanding
Officer, the Executive Offi squadron, group, and/cr force
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, chiefs quarters
and individual sailers. He is present at many meetings,
including department head meetings. The information he
acquires from all of these sources may he very useful to
ethers who do not have these information resources. Ihe
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command exercises consid-
erable fewer based upon his access to decision premises. He
knows why decisions were made and what factors were taken
into account. In the author's opinion this could very well
be his greatest tool.
3- Chief Pett^ Cfficers
Ihe Chief Petty Officers have experienced effects of
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program in
several ways. The senior Chief Petty Officer has tradition-
ally held the position (either explicitly or implicitly) of
"Mess President" for the Chief's Mess. He was traditionally
the chief to officiate at Chief Petty Officers' initiations,
and to speak for the Chief's mess when requested. Ihe
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program has
however, altered the traditional position, at least in
degree.
Irior to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program, the Chief Petty Officers could exercise
coercive power on surordinates to whatever degree he felt
that his chain of command would support him. There was, of
course, the ability for every sailor to go beyond each level
in the chain until reaching the Captain. The sailor might
risk repercussions for going "over the head" of some offi-
cials, tut he could weigh those risks against his needs for
a certain decision and proceed accordingly. The chief also
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often exercised coercive power over his division officer.
The chief could go ever the division officer's head and
appeal tc the department head. Not only would the division
officer risk having his decision overturned, but there was a
risk that the department head would see the officer as
unable tc manage his division. The chief could also coerce
certain division officer action by the implicit threat to
not support the officer in his tasks which for most division
officers, would be a significant penalty.
Ihe coercive power of individual chiefs has been
enhanced in some respects and reduced in others by the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program. Eecause
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command provides the
Commanding Officer direct inputs, the chief can utilize this
access tc whatever extent his alliance with the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command will allow. The chief has the
ability tc provide uncomplimentary information to the
Commanding Officer via the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command. Cn the other hand, the chief is exposed to a
degree of ccercive pewer from those who work for him. The
sailers in his division can also use the Master Chief Petty
Officer cf the Command to pass uncomplimentary information
to the chief's supervisors. Overall, one would expect the
chief's power base tc be increased since he will have more
contact and an infornal relationship with the Master Chief
fetty Officer of the Command.
Ihe increased reward power base exercised by the
chief clcsely parallels the reward power of the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command. The chief has an alternative
communications route available to the Commanding Officer and
Executive Officer if he wants to gain reward for cne cf his
men. Again, this can serve to enhance his position or
reduce his power base:if individuals who normally rely on
the chief for rewards now receive rewards from the Master
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Chief Petty Officer of the Command, then the Chief is no
longer the only source of reward. for example, if the
Division Chief granted early liberty on Fridays when the
division had worked especially hard, he could obtain a
certain amount of influence over nis division towards
performing well. If the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command can obtain liberty for the crew or even that divi-
sion frcm the Commanding Officer, the influence of the
Chiefs reward is reduced. Od the other hand, if the Chief
wanted to grant extra liberty but could not (cr even
relieved that he could not) because of his division officer
and the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command persuaded
the Commanding Officer that the division deserved liberty,
the Chief's reward power would be enhanced. It is important
to note that none of the players have to know the wishes of
the ethers cr the existence of any conflicts. The division
officer above does not have "to lose" in order for the Chief
to gain. The division officer may be perfectly willing to
hold early liberty tut since he was not involved in the
process, he will not gain the reward influence; the Chief
will.
Each of the other power sources of the Chief are
affected by the increased status of the Master Chief Petty
Cfficer of the Command but three stand out as critical to
all cf them. These three are: alliances, decision
premises, and dependence.
Ihe Chief Petty Officers 1 mess is traditionally a
very close-knit group. They eat, sleep, and relax in very
close guarters. They are distinguished from other enlisted
personnel and officers by their uniforms, age (in general),
and many other factors. The Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command is their representative to the Commanding
Officer. Everyone en board knows this and everyone assumes
that the Master Chief Petty Cfficer of the Command has a
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loyalty to his fellow Chief Petty Officers. The individual
Chief Petty Officers therefore, are assumed to have an alli-
ance with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command.
All Chief Petty Officers therefore enjoy an allied power
source even if they do not have a particularly favorable
relationship with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command.
The Master Clief Petty Officer of the Command has
direct communications to the Commanding Officer. The Chief
Petty Officers have direct communications with the Master
Chief fetty Officer of the Command. If the Chief Petty
Officers have a question regarding the reasoning or inten-
tion cf a command policy, the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command can directly inquire for them. The Commanding
Officer can explain his position in an informative way
rationalizing that tie chain of command did not adequately
inform the Chief Petty Officers. The Chief Petty Officers
will eventually get an understanding of the situation from
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. The chain of
command, on the ether hand, may not be able to question the
Commanding Officer's reasoning for fear of reprisal. This
situation may very well have been a key factor in the commu-
nications failure of the early 1970's. It will be addressed
again with regards to junior officers. It is obvious,
however, that the Chief Petty Officers have excellent access
to the decision premises at the command level. The survey
results (Question 31, Appendix E ) indicate that a signifi-
cant majority of Chief Petty Officers and officers feel that
the wcrd received in the Chief Petty Officers* mess is more
accurate than the wcrd received via the chain cf command.
This telief gets sticnger as the respondents become more
distant from the Commanding Officer in the traditional chain
of command.
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Ihe dependence base for the Chief Petty Officers has
been shifted by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program in a very similar fashion as decision prem-
ises ard information flow. A key factor here is that the
Chief Petty Officers are managers and managers need informa-
tion to he effective. The Chiefs know this and they know
that there is another very active and effective conduit for
this information from the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command. Their dependence on the chain of command has
therefore been reduced.
** • Enl ist ed Personnel
Ihe original purpose of the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command program and its predecessor, the
Senior Enlisted Advisor was to ensure a representative
enlisted input was provided to the Commanders and Commanding
Officers so that they could better guarantee the morale and
well-being of the troops- Ihe human resources aspects of
the enlisted community have improved in many ways and will
be discussed in Chapter V. Has the power base for the
enlisted community improved? Are enlisted personnel better
able tc influence their job situation than they were before
the program began?
Ihe coercive power base of the enlisted personnel
has increased in relation to their dealings with the chain
of command. As applied to the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command and Chief Petty Officers, the enlisted personnel
have an alternative route to the Commanding Officer which
will give them a relatively safe metnod to seek reversals of
decisions or redresses for felt-wrong done by someone in the
chain of ccmmand. Ihis fact will reduce the probability
that a taskmaster chief or division officer will go too far.
Ihe gain enjoyed by enlisted personnel is really a reflec-
tion of the reduced coercive powers of the chiefs and cffi-
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cers. The author dees not see any significant changes in
reward, expert, referent, representative, legitimate, or
activity bases. Enlisted personnel do benefit from the
implied alliance with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command. Again, this is really indicative of a reduced
power advantage for the officers and chiefs. Also, as
mentioned previously, the author suspects that the real
alliance of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
will be with the Commanding Officer and chiefs, not the
junior enlisted personnel. The most significant power base
increase for the enlisted community is the additional deci-
sion prenises (inf ornation) which the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command can generate and provide. The Master
Chief Petty Officer cf the Command can provide strategic
rationale for many of the events which may have been hard to
understand before. Ihe more information sailors have, the
tetter ttey will be able to perform their tasks.
As may seem reasonable and appropriate to many, a
key issue in the political perspective from the standpoint
of the enlisted personnel is dependency. Enlisted personnel
have relatively specific job reguirements. They supervise
fewer personnel and therefore reguire less influence ability
en organizational issues. Enlisted personnel are afforded
less authority than chiefs and officers. Because they are
less influential or powerful, however, does not reguire them
to be more dependent en others for their own well-being and
individual needs. The greatest fallacy, in the author's
opinion, regarding the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program is the belief that the Navy has reduced the
enlisted man's dependency or improved his ability to provide
for his needs. The enlisted community ( with the possible
exception cf the chiefs ) has nc more and no less influence
or power than the community has ever had. The effect of the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program has been
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to shift seme of that dependency away from the chain cf
command in favor of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command. The overall result of this situation will be
discussed in Chapter 1 and the summary.
5 - J unior Officers
In discussing the pclitical effects of the Master
Chief Petty Officer cf the Command program on junior offi-
cers, the author is grouping together managers with diverse
experience and tack grounds . The term "Junior Officer" as
used in this project, refers to newly commissioned Ensigns
and Warrant Officers with twenty years of experience; offi-
cers serving as Assistant CIC Officer and as Operations
Officer. The only real common bond among the group is that
they are commissioned officers who have a subunit of a ship
(department, division, etc.) for which they are held accoun-
table. In general, the illustrations will involve a typical
division officer as the junior officer unless a signifi-
cantly different situation exists for department heads,
limited duty or warrant officers.
Coercive power for the junior officer has often been
at the rcct of leadership problems. Many junior officers
come intc the fleet with very little experience in any work,
environment. They are immediately tasked to provide leader-
ship ard management to a group of sailors, many of whom are
more experienced and most of whom are better educated in the
technical aspects of the job. The junior officer is most
likely still aware of his own indoctrination experience-
Ihe use cf coercive power may seem like the most logical
tool for getting things done. The junior officer may be
experiencing coercion from his superiors to attain seme
qualification or get something done before liberty. The
implied (and often specific) message is "Perform, or else.
"
The junior officer lives in a coercive world. The misuse of
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coercive power is net at all unusual. To significantly
reduce tie misuse of this type of unconstructive power is a
noble and very worthy cause in the U". S. Navy. Does the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program help in
this area?
The junior officer has coercive power over his
subordinates in exactly to same many in which the Chief
Petty Officer does. He can threaten to punish or withheld
reward from his subordinates to whatever extent his chain of
command will support him. The junior officer can threaten
to take a sailor to mast or restrict him to the ship for
some behavicr which the junior officer wants to influence on
the part of the sailer. The threat will have influence only
to the extent that the sailor believes that the department
head, Executive Officer, and Commanding Officer will support
the junicr officer. Because the sailor is close in age,
experience, and credibility to the junior officer, he will
be more willing to "test" the coercive power by taking the
issue tc another level in the chain of command- With the
introduction of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program, the sailor has an alliance with someone who
can contact the senior echelons of management to gain a
redress for unjust coercion. The Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Command is a safeguard against undue coercive power.
The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command therefore,
reduces the coercive power base of the junior officer.
Ihe reward pewer of the junior officer has been
affected by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
program in two basic ways. First, the junior officer used
to be the critical link between those managers who observed
rewardable performance (Chief Petty Officers) and those in
authority tc actually reward (Commanding Officer, Executive
Officer) . With the presence of the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command, the junior officer is not the
59
critical link. The fact that another route is available
reduces the dependency on the junior officer. The second
major area in which the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program affects the reward power of the junior
officer is the position of the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command on the various boards which consider regards.
The Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist, Sailor of the
Quarter, striker boards and the designated awards board are
examples.
The expert tower of the junior officer has essen-
tially been unchanged by the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command program. Other factors, however, have affected
this power base for the junior officer. With the ever
increasing technology of naval warfare, the junior officers
are being pushed to become more and more technically profi-
cient in their jobs. Gunnery officers of years gone by,
supervised and coordinated the employment of turrets and
mounts. Today, the junior officer in the Combat Systems
department is more likely to be assigned to actually sit at
an NIDS console and perform the "manual" aspects of gunfire
while being supervised by a Tactical Action Officer rather
than supervise a gun aount crew. The expert power for the
job has increased because of this trend.
Another power base which the author believes has
expanded for the junior officer is that of representation.
Historically, the junior officer was distinguished from
enlisted personnel by differences in education, background,
financial status, social status, and many other trappings of
his position (fiflIP: Bank Hath Its Privileges) In today's
Navy, many of these differences have narrowed. while a
college degree is not held by a majority of enlisted
personnel, many have a significant number of undergraduate
credits. The technical training received by enlisted
personnel which is necessary to meet the needs of the Navy
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also serves to close the education gap. The competitive
selection process of colleges and universities and the
availability of various financing opportunities for educa-
tion have provided a tetter cross-section of college gradu-
ates and therefore a better cross-section of junicr
officers. The pay incentives over the past six to seven
years have effectively narrowed the financial gap tetween
junicr officers and enlisted personnel. Regulations have
changed in favor of tetter habitability and messing and mere
personal freedoms (civilian clothes, for example) . All of
these improved conditions have helped to bolster the esteem
cf the enlisted man. At the same time, the "privileges" of
rank have deteriorated for the junior officer. Plushly
decorated wardrooms attended to by stewards, formally served
meals, and staterocns attended to by stewards have all
disappeared. The result has teen a decrease in the "esteem"
demonstrated by the cemmand for the junior officer. Again,
the gap tetween enlisted and junior officer has narrowed.
Hith the overall affect of the narrowed gap
discussed atove, the junior officer has gained in one very
important power base. The junior officer is seen more and
more as a part of the division "team" rather than an
outsider. Because of this better relationship, the enlisted
personnel are more inclined to allow the junior officer to
speak for the group. They believe that the junicr officer
does have some idea of their interests and concerns and
trust him tc represent their best interests.
The activities of the junior officer have changed
ever the last couple of decades. The author does not
presume to imply that these changes have been a result of
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Cemmand program
entirely. Indeed, there is a logical argument that the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program has
changed as a result cf the activities of junior officers.
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That the two have evolved simultaneously however, is
sufficient reason to investigate the overall impact without
persuing a "cause and effect" relationship.
As discussed earlier, the junior officer is partici-
pating Jiore and more in the technical aspects of naval
warfare. The decreased reaction time, increased complexity
of the threat, increased technology of sensor and weapon
systems, and the possibly catastrophic results of miscalcu-
lation or delay have mandated that tne Navy put the "top
team" on watch at all times. To enhance watch teams, ships
have department heads (as Tactical Action Officers) super-
vising other junior officers functioning as CIC watch offi-
cers, Ship's Weapons Coordinators, Anti-Submarine Warfare
watch Officers, and ether specific and technically demanding
roles. The necessity to function well in these capacities
was the driving force behind the Surface Warfare Officer
gualificaticn program and is the driving factor in the
increased technical training reguired of officers. Overall,
the junicr officer is spending significantly more time in
activities requiring expertise and achievement on a personal
basis rather than activities involved in management and
group leadership. The activities of the junior officer
indicate that he is involved in the operating aspects of the
ship's business rather than the strategic or tactical
aspects. In this area, the department heads are probably in
a distinctly different situation than the division officers.
Department heads' activities are indicative of tactical
concerns rather than operating concerns.
Eecision premises for the junior officer are
supplied by the chain of command. The department head
relies en the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer, the
division officer relies on the Executive Officer and his
department head. The dependence of the junior officer on
the chain cf command has not changed. What has changed as
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result cf the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
program is that the junior officer's subordinates no longer
rely solely on the chain of command for information on which
to make decisions. As discussed earlier, the Chiefs cttain
information from the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command and pass it en to the sailors. Under these condi-
tions/ it is not unusual for the chief to be able to provide
information to the junior officer which should have come
from the junior officer.
fcithout doubt, the most significant power base loss
for the junior officer is that of dependency. The junior
officer still depends on his subordinates for the accom-
plishment of his mission. He still depends on his seniors
for the resources and support needed to accomplish his
mission. However, his subordinates no longer rely solely,
or even primarily, on the junior officer to meet their
needs. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
program and many of the other "personnel" programs have
organizationally reduced sailors dependency on the chain of
command for individual needs. This reduction of dependency
has resulted in a significant reduction in the junior
officer dependency power base. What is the effect of this
reduction in power?
People held accountable for the results produced by
others, whose fcimal role gives them the right to
command but who lack informal political influence,
access to resources, outside status, sponsorship, or
mobility prospects, are rendered powerless in the
organization ... tley lac k control over their own fate
and are dependent on others above them.
[Bef. 16]
While the author does not intend to imply that the
junicr officer community is "powerless", the author dees
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relieve that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Ccirmaiid
program is indicative of a reduced po¥er base for the junior
officer and is concerned with the degree to which they nay




A. TBEOBI AND BACKGBCOND
lop executives dc not drive trucks, run machines, or
chip paint. They deal in symbols. £Eef. 17]. Symbols
provide a means for managing organizational culture and
values which can not re effectively managed by conventional
management tools. Symbols tell employees and observers
about what counts in the organization. Symbols tell indi-
viduals where they fit into the organization relative to
others. [fief. 10] Symbols can be acts, words, or objects
used to represect something entirely apart from the act,
word, cr object- Some ccmmon types of symbols include:
language, legos, rituals, humor, play, ceremonies, myths,
time, clcthing, and several aspects of physical space, such
as location, size, and decor. Table V provides an example
of each of the symbols listed. Traditional theories of
organizations depict a rational and linear connection
between organizational activities, events, and outcomes.
Decisions made by leaders solve problems. Organizational
structure is determined to best coordinate activity.
Organizational authority is given to personnel in response
to the organizational function which they perform. The
rational and linear relation between organizational activi-
ties or structure and outcomes is not supported in the
symbolic perspective. Leaders produce "decisions" to prob-
lems not as a solution but rather as a ritual of leadership,
for example, many " decisions " made by a Commanding Officer





Language "Walk softly and carry a big stick," in
a very brief phrase told the American
people and others a great deal about the
>ersonality and values of President
!eddy Roosevelt.
Logo. Wealing a spcrt-shirt with a polo-player
or alligator on the left breast is
interpreted by many as saying something
about the style of the person wearing
the shirt.
Bitual.. ... • . . Piping-abcard of a senior officer demon-
strates a ship's respect for his position
and acknowledges the importance of his
visit.
Humor/Play.... Teasing of a junior member of an organi-
zatcn ("George" Ensign) tells him that he
is accepted as a member and that the lack
of experience within the group is not
adversely considered.
Ceremonies.... The wedding ceremony tells the public
that the individuals have chosen to live
tocether under the conditions (love,
honor, cherish) of the institution
performing the marriage.
Time/Access... The personal secretary to a CEO is
afforded significantly more considera-
tion than other secretaries simply be-
cacse of the time spent with access to
the CEO.
Clothing The military rank insignia is an obvious
example, however, civilians have their
examples also. MacDonald's managers wear
civilian attire while all others are
required to wear uniforms.
Physical Space
A) Size i.... The executive with a 20* x 40* office
will be higher in the organizational
structure than one who has a 5* ty 10'
cubby.
B) Location: lenthouses generally accommodate Chief
Executives.
C) Decor:......... The supervisor who conducts business
from across a large ttahagony desk will
elicit a different response from one
who sits beside an employee on a folding
chair.
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Structure can b€ used to reduce uncertainty and ambi-
guity regarding the fit between individuals and the organi-
zation. Authorities and responsibilities can be shifted to
demonstrate who holds power in the organization. Symbols
can be used to create organizational culture or myths.
These iiyths express the desires, unexpressed or unconscious
wishes, and ambi valencies of those who perpetuate the myths.
Many Ccmmanding Officers have proclaimed to their crew that
their ship was "the best in the Navy." The Commanding
Officer has no empirical data and maybe even no illusion to
support this claim but that matters little, if at all. The
Commanding Officer is expressing his desire for his ship to
be the test and he is trying to "sell" this belief or desire
to his crew. If the myth is accepted by the crew, it will
provide a source of cohesion, esteem, and purpose.
Cultural myths help to mediate ambivalence or contra-
dictions. For example, despite the American expressed
dismay at the Bussian invasion of Afganistanin 1980, a
significant majority of Americans strongly supported the
American invasion of Grenada in 1983. While the example may
seem absurd, it was the American myth as "Defender of
Democracy" and "Protector of the West", that allowed
Americans to quickly resolve the "difference" between the
two events. Persons who are not familiar with the American
myths, such as Soviet citizens or Third World peoples
probably saw the two events as being very similar.
Now that we know what symbols are, how can we apply them
to the organization? The effective leader can use symbols
to act out the vision or goals which he seeks for the orga-
nization. If the executives are focusing on the strategic
concerns of the organization, they will not have time to
involve themselves in the more routine aspects of the orga-
nization's activities. Symbolic behavior can effectively
and convincingly tunnel the energies of subordinates in the
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direction of strategic goals. Middle and junior executives
can new supervise the tactical or operational implementation
of the goals without further significant involvement fiom
top management. But what symbolic behaviors best enable the
executive in conveying strategic direction?
The executive's priorities will best be displayed by the
manner in which he allocates his time. Actions speak leuder
than words. As Eli Ginsberg and Ewing W. Reilley noted:
"Those a few exhelons from the top are always alert tc the
chief executive. Although they attach importance to what he
says, they will be truly impressed only by what he dees."
[Eef. 18] The chief executive can state that he is very
interested in improving the work environment for his
employees. Very little is likely to nappen. However/ let
the chief executive fire a plant supervisor for poor envi-
ronmental conditions and the entire organization will be
committed to environmental improvement almost immediately.
The action does not have to be dramatic to be effective.
The same chief executive could note a few specific discrep-
ancies and include them as agenda items at the next manage-
ment meeting. Managers will note that the chief executive
really is interested in environment. If that same chief
executive expresses his interest in work environment but
evaluates, rewards and promotes based on cost reductions,
all of the "would-be-chief executives" will turn off air
conditioners and heaters to reduce costs.
Another significant symbolic tool for the chief execu-
tive is the use he makes of his personal staff and key offi-
cers. The size of his staff, their prerequisites, and their
perogatives will demonstrate his goals and his style. If
his staff is large and relatively free to investigate all
areas of the organization, the chief executive will be seen
as involved and concerned with the on-going routine opera-
tional procedures. If the personal staff is relatively
68
confined to "headquarters" activities, the chief executive
demonstrates his reliance on .divisional executives to handle
operating matters while he focuses on "headquarters"
matters.
Augmenting the symbolic tools discussed above, frequency
and consistency can multiply the effects of symbolic leader-
ship. In the example of concern for work environment, the
inclusion of environment subjects on the first adenda will
cause subordinates to stop and consider the issue. If a
legitimate environment item (not necessarily negative)
appears en the agenda every third or fourth meeting, the
subordinates will incorporate the issue as part of the orga-
nizational culture. The executive committed to change
should be constantly on the lookout for opportunities to
reinforce activities which support his strategic goals.
[fief. 17]
Settings are another tool used by leaders. A chief
executive may want to convey his belief that assembly line
workers are the "backbone" of the company. He could send
out a memo via the chain of command, provide a message to
the cempany newspaper, or even provide his message directly
to the foreman of the assembly line. His message will have
little impact on the workers. If however, the chief execu-
tive stands in front of the assembled workers at the
assembly line, his message will not only be communicated,
they will also be demonstrated. If the boss wants to empha-
size the strategic importance of any aspect of the organiza-
tion, he must be seen involved in that aspect because he
personifies the strategic interests of the company.
Symbclogy is a powerful tool for the executive. While
ether methods can be used to incrementally adjust the day to
day activities of the organization, symbology may be the
most useful tool making dramatic and relatively permanent
changes in a strategic direction. There is a significant
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consideration in the use of the frame. As useful as it
obviously is, it can also be extremely dangerous. Symhology
can act as a double-edged sword. It can he purposely used
to misdirect the energies of constituents. It can acci-
dently he employed with disasterous results. The user of
symhology must understand all aspects of its employment.
for example, on May 28, 1984 an unidentified serviceman
killed in Viet Nam was entombed at Arlington Natior.al
Cemetary at the Tomb cf the Unknowns. The ceremony as orig-
inally intended was tc serve as a statement of the nation's
recogniticn of the sacrifices made by the soldiers and
sailors who gave up their lives in American wars. Despite
the inability to attach a name with each body, the citizens
cf America honored all "unknown" as heros. This widely
respected symbolic jesture has been accepted since the
entombment cf the first Unknown in 192J. The entombment of
this serviceman has been seen by many in a different light.
For many Americans, the ceremony was the final chapter in a
war which was very unpopular and traumatic for the country.
In many ways this parallels the traditional symhology of
funerals— the end of the tragic loss of a loved one. To
ether Americans, the ceremony symbolized an unacceptable
change of Aaerican pclicies. Wives, children, and friends
of men still listed as "missing in action", saw the ceremony
as the American government prematurely closing the beck on
Viet Nam . Some had been seeking government support and
more pressure on the Vietnamese in hopes of finding loved
ones cr at least the remains. For them the symhology was
not a "coming to term" but rather a denial of continued
responsibility to resolve the unanswered guestions.
Symhology is powerful and cuts many different ways.
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B- SIIBC1IC IMPACT OP THE MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICES OF THE
CCMMAHD
Much of the symbolic impact of the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command program has been discussed in the
previous chapters. In each of the other perspectives, the
Master Chief Petty Cfficer of the Command program is a
generally minor organizational change if the program and its
functions are taken exactly as promulgated. The author
parallel€d the structural impact of the Master Chief Petty
Cfficer cf the Command program to a structural shift from
divisional responsibilities to functional responsibilites in
which tie Master Chief Petty Cfficer of the Command had the
functional area of erlisted personnel concerns. The author
is aware that neither Admiral Zumwalt nor any of his succe-
sors ever considered such a specific structural change. The
argument for the effect of "functional structure" is based
solely on the symbolic interpretation of the program. For
this reason, the symbolic impact of the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command program will be discussed in sutsec-
tions, each of which may be somewhat redundant of the
previous three chapters, but considered necessary.
Additionally, the types of symbols listed in Table 7 will be
compared with various aspects of the Master Chief Petty
Cfficer cf the Command program.
1 . Symbolic Structure
Ihe language of the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command program (CPNAVINST 5400. 37CJ clearly states that
the program was designed not to interfere with the
traditional chain of command. The instruction states:
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Functioning as senior enlisted advisors to the
commander/commanding officer, working within the
chain of command, Fleet, Force, and Command Master
Chiefs strengthen the traditional single chain cf
command by keeping the commander/Commanding Officer
aware of existing or potential situations
<
proce-
dures, and practices which affect the welfare and
morale of Navy aen and wcmen under that command's
cognizance. [fief- 19]
The instruction also indicates that there is not a
second chain of command in addition to the "traditional
single" cne- While in one aspect the intent is to suggest
that the traditional chain of command will not be threat-
ened, the second message ccmes across that there is now a
formal alternative structure to the traditional chain. Ihe
interpretation of what this second formal structure does to
the organization as a whole is not easily identified. Ihe
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command participates in
matters "which affect the welfare and morale..." If this is
seen as his function, then it would be logical to see his
structural role as functional vice divisional. The concept
of dual management can be applied if individuals define
"Welfare and morale" as "relationship orientation" with the
traditional chain cf command attending to task-oriented
matters. With the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
reporting to the Commander/ Commanding Officer, delegation of
enlisted matters via the traditional chain of command is
less critical. The Commanding Officer, assisted by his
staff specialist on enlisted morale and welfare will tend to
this natter himself. The Commanding Officer has "his" own
representative at the various committees and has no need to
depend en the Chairman or officers present to either
represent him or advise him on subject matters.
Another symbolic structural consideration that is
extrenely important in the author's opinion is that the
Haster Chief Petty Officer of the Command functions as the
72
"senior enlisted" person at a command. He represents "them"
to the Commanding Officer. The Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Command program highlights a difference retween
"them" and "the commaid". If observers interpret this as a
difference tetween individual personal goals and the goals
of the organization, then the difference is merely a state-
ment of fact and a difference with which every organizaton
must deal. If, on the other hand, observers interpret the
difference as between the traditional chain of ccmiaid and
the enlisted community, the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command program is defining the team leader for the
enlisted team in an "us versus them" organization. Why must
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command represent the
needs of the enlisted community to the Commanding Officer?
The ycung recruit might answer that guestion by saying "I
guess because the officers won't do it."
Ihe final structural consideration in the symtolic
frame is the affect that the program nas on the position of
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command himself. If
the purpose of the program was to help keep the Commanding
Officer "in touch" with the enlisted community, then the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command ought to himself
be "in touch" with the enlisted community. If the Master
Chief Petty Officer cf the Command is charged to be directly
responsible to the Commanding Cfficer/Executive Officer, not
assigned to divisional duties, work with the Commanding
Officer/Executive Officer in the dissemination and promotion
of "command" policy, attend meetings and participate in
ceremonies, then he will not be "in touch" with the enlisted
community. He will be "in touch" with the Commanding
Officer and other Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Commands. The junior enlisted man may see the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command as the top management team.
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2- Svatolic Pov€ i
Ihe previous chapter discussed in great details the
numerous sources of power and influence which can he exer-
cised at various times by people in an organization. Many
cf the suggested explications of the effects of the Master
Chief Petty Officer of the Command program in the political
perspective were based upon the author's interpretation of
the symtclic impact of the program. This section will
attempt to demonstrate the political interpretations of the
types of symbols found in and around the Master Chief Petty
Officer cf the Command program.
Ihe language of the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Ccmaand is provided by OPNAVINST 5400. 37C. According to
that instruction, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command
has proven to be valuable asset in stimulating
free flow communications at all levels within the
chain cf command.
...... working within the chain of
command. .. strengthen the traditional single chain cf
command...
.....commanding officer's principal enlisted
advisor in formulation and implementation of poli-
cies concerning morale, welfare, job satisfaction,
discipline, utilization, and training of Navy's men
and women.
working with the internal chain of command as
directed by the commander/commanding officer.
.....takes precedence over all other enlisted
members within a command.
.....commanders/commanding officers will provide
1. visibility
2. office space and clerical support .
3. Attendance at appropriate seminars and
conferences. - .
£Eef. 19]
Ihe language is very clear that the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command is not a part of the tradi-
tional chain of command. The language goes on to stress the
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intent of the progran is not to threaten the traditional
chain cf command. The language acknowledges that there is
concern for the impact of the program on the chain cf
command.
Ihe language cf the program is very power oriented.
Ihe instruction places great emphasis on the symbols of
power. Access to tie commanding officer must he direct and
expansive. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
will he involved in cclicy matters from formulation through
implementation. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command will be given visibility and office space. Ihe
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command will take prece-
dence over all other chiefs. All of this power language is
symbolic evidence that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command is part cf tcp management-'
Ihe logo of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program is the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command pin. The fact that the pin exists is rather unim-
portant. Ihe true symbology of the pin is that the pin is
uorn in the same manner as a command-at-sea pin. The pin
appears to be the enlisted ccmmand-at-sea equivalent.
Ceremonies involved with the Master Chief Petty
Officer cf the Command program include inspections, recep-
tion of visitors, and awards ceremonies among others.
Traditionally, the Commanding Officer is presented a
division for inspection by the junior officer in charge of
that division. The Commanding Officer and division officer
then inspect together with the Commanding Officer making
remarks to the individual sailor and/or the division
officer. The department head and Executive Officer would
follow behind and generally were not addressed by the
Commanding Officer. Today, the Commanding Officer is gener-
ally accompanied to inspection by the Master Chief Petty
Officer cf the Command. The division officer still presents
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the division and leads the Commanding Officer through the
inspection line. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command often follows directly behind the Commanding
Officer. The symbclogy shows the troops that tne Master
Chief Petty Officer of the Command is a key figure in the
opinion of the Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer
wants the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command involved
in major issues of the enlisted community. The Commanding
Officer respects the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command's opinion.
Many of the Commanding Officers interviewed stated
that having the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command at
inspections served another purpose. The Commanding Cfficers
often direct questions and comments to the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command tecause the Master Chiefs were
usually the best informed concerning uniform regulations and
procedures. The Commanding Officers felt that if the
department head or division officer agreed with the
Commanding Officer's comments, the man being inspected would
feel like they were merely playing to the Captain's Mhims
but by involving the Master Chief Petty Cfficer of the
Command, the man being inspected would see that an "unbi-
ased" or even "prc-enlis ted" opinion agreed with the
Commarding Officer's comment- The Commanding Officers also
said that division officers tend to say "yes, sir" and "No
excuse, sir" too often while the Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Command had a better understanding of the situation
and would tell the Commanding Officer if there was a reason-
able explanation, such as "I agree, Captain, but the ship's
store has not had shoe polish for three months." Ihe
symbolic implications of an inspection conducted in this
manner are unmistakable.
The time and access symbology of the Master Chief
Petty Cfficer of the Command program is guite clear. The
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Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has direct and
continuous access to the Commanding Officer. He can get
command attention on any situation or problem. The Master
Chief Petty Officer of the Command is the only member of the
command ether than tie Commanding Officer that has a formal
and legitimate communication link outside the command.
The physical space symbology of the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command program is equally as clear as
that of time and access, especially in SORFLANT. Atoard
naval ships, there is almost no commodity as valuable as
space. £epartment heads fight over every square foot. Many
department beads do not have offices and virtually every
division officer works out of his stateroom. All of this
not withstanding, the instruction directs the Commanding
Officer to provide office space where physically feasible.
3- Symbolic Human Resources
The symbology of the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command program is extremely important in the human
resource perspective. The mere existence of the program
makes very important symbolic statements:
1. The U. S. Navy recognizes the critical impor-
tance of the enlisted men and women who serve
therein.
2. The Navy acknowledges individuals' needs and
demonstrates its interest in meeting those,
needs.
Each of these statements is a worthy idea and serves
an important purpose. The fact that the program dees make
these two symbolic statements is sufficient justification to
guarantee the program in some form. Are there ether
symbolic statements made by the program's existence? Ihe
author feels that there are and will highlight these in the
next chapter. For no*, however, it is important to at least
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note that any program which involves people, makes seme t^pe
of symbolic statement about the organization's attitudes
towards ceople. Programs typically imply a level cf trust
or distrust, care or lack of care, prioritization, and many
ether value judgements which the organization has made,
either consciously cr unconsciously.
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V. HO BAN EESCUflCE PERSPECTIVE
Id the United States, management has turned to the
behavior sciences and motivation theorists to expand their
ability to maximize the productivity of the human resources
used in organizations. The U. S. Navy has been no excep-
tion, leadership training for naval officers has
included review of theories ranging from Maslow^ hierarchy
to Hhyte^s participatory management. More than reviewing
theories, the Navy has taken active steps to improve the
situation of the human assets which make-up the Navy. Ihe
steps have included increased attention to pay incentives,
more attention to the needs of the serviceman's family,
tetter health care, more attention to habitability bcth
ashore and afloat, and other "people" oriented improvements
too numerous to mention. While the efforts to improve the
situation fcr Navymen have been on going for many decades,
the necessity to increase managerial attention escalated
significantly during the Viet Nam era. Liberal legislation
and judicial rulings, the popularization of anti-American,
anti-nil it a ry attitudes, the rapid sophistication of warfare
technology, and the increased educational level of recruits
and the general population made the task of the military a
much more challenging job. As Viet Nam came to a close,
the Navy faced numerous manpower problems. The increased
anti-establishment attitude of the younger recruits, the
feverish racial issues of the day, and the impending threat
of the "All Volunteer Force", demonstrated the need to do
something tc improve the situation. Admiral Zumwalt made
dynamic efforts in the human resource area. He tasked his
7S
subordinates to exercise the very best leadership to
encourage personnel tc support the Navy. He took organiza-
tional steps to ensure institutional discrimination was
erased. He initiated programs designed to prevent drug
abuse .from undermining the human resources of the Navy.
Admiral Zumwalt knew that he could not fix the situation by
himself so he solicited assistance for subordinate officers
and erlisted personnel- Two of the organizational changes
that came from his efforts were: the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command program and the Human Resources
Management program. Both were charged with the same task:
help improve the fit between the needs of the U. S. Navy and
the needs cf the individual serviceman.
A- HOHAH EESOOBCE TEIOBIES
lo mention even the important theories in human resource
management is a significant task. Most managers today
recognize at least a dozen or so "prominent" theorists
including Maslow, McGregor, Weber, Herzberg, Vroom, Elake,
Mouton, Irench, Raven, Peters, Argyris, Likert and many,
many mere. For this reason, the author has chesen to
discuss the final perspective in terms of approaches to
individual motivation and general patterns of managerial
approaches to motivation. While this may be a somewhat
limited focus, the approaches and patterns will reflect many
of the theories espoused by those listed above- Before
moving into the discussion it is important to note that
motivation is not the only factor in obtaining organiza-
tional needs from individuals- Each individual adds to
organizational objectives based on motivation, ability, and
role perception- If any one of these factors is low, the
overall contribution cf an individual will tend to be lew.
Por example, even if a quarterback is highly motivated and
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can throw a football farther and with more accuracy than any
ether quarterback in the lague, he will not contribute to
the overall team performance if he does not understand that
he is to
1. throw the ball cnl/ to his team-mates,
2. call different types of plays to confuse the oppo-
nents
3. stay behind the blockers for protection, etc.
cthei words, if the quarterback does not understand his
role cr job.
£Hef. 6]
1 - Ac^ioach es
Ihe Con tent approach to motivation stresses the
importance of the factors within individuals. These factors
will cause individuals to act in certain ways. In ether
words, people will take a course of action to fulfill a need
which is self-imposed. The best known of the content theo-
ries is Maslow's "Hierarchy of Needs" in which human needs
are categorized into five levels: physiological, security,
social, esteem, and self-actualization.
Ihe process approach to motivation stresses the
importance cf applied factors. Rewards and punishment can
induce certain behavior frcm individuals independently of
what their needs may have been prior to the application cf
the outside factors. The extent to which the individual
believes that an action on his part will result in a reac-
tion, and the degree to which he wants that reaction to
cccur will determine his motivation to participate in the
action.
Ope ran t conditioning is a subset of the prccess
approach. As in the process approach, operant conditicning
theories state that motivation is affected by outside
81
factors. However, operant conditioning suggests that moti-
vation for the future will he hased on consequences of the
past. Ihis line of thought suggests that individuals will
choose those activities which in the past, lead to favcratle
results.
2 . Hod els
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, managers
have had to deal with changing employee attitudes, abili-
ties, and requirements. The following three models are
indicative cf the attitudes and operating procedures with
which management may be approaching organization personnel
considerations. [fief- 20]
According to the traditional model, the task of the
manager is to ensure that the workers perform their work
despite its unpleasantness and their lack of interest in it.
Ihe only effective way to motivate workers is to provide
sufficient monetary rewards to "buy"the use of their ener-
gies. Ihis model also relies heavily on the use of close
supervision and specific task assignment. The basis of the
traditional model of motivation is to influence employees to
accept the work demands placed upon them by management.
Employees are motivated to do as they are told.
In the huma n relations model, managers recognize
that employees can be motivated by factors other than noney.
Ihe importance of the social/interpersonal relationships at
the wcrk place are acknowledged. The human relations model
assumes that people want to feel important and productive,
and tc be recognized as individuals. Managements main task
is to make each employee feel useful and important. He
should communicate with subordinates and listen tc their
objections or complaints. Management should allow seme
self-direction on routine work to accommodate the workers'
need to feel useful. If management is successful with
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communications and allowing some self-direction he can
expect tie employees to be more satisfied and cooperative.
This increased cooperation will allow the organization to
increase efficiency and production.
Ihe human resources model calls for managers to
recognize that employees may very well obtain as much satis-
faction from their jobs as the boss does from his. Work is
not inherently bad. Employees want to be a part of a worth-
while crganization and will willingly give time and effort
to goals in which they believe. Management should encourage
as much self-direction as coordination and abilities allow.
The managers' main task is to make the maximum use of the
potential of every individual by removing unnecessary
restraints and organizational obstacles which block self-
actualization and hamper self-esteem. The manager who
successfully employs the human resource model can expect his
subordinates to be highly satisfied as a resul t of the
organization's and individual's improved efficiency and
production- [fief. 20]
E. HDMAN BESOUBCES ABD THE MASTEB CHIEF PETTY OFFICES OF
TEE CCHHAHD EBOGEAM
Ihe correlation between the motivation theories and
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program may seem
elusive but the author believes that the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command program is indicative of the tasic
precepts of human value and human resource management. In
keeping with the format of earlier chapters, the human
resource perspective .of the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command program hill be discussed in five sections of
"interest" groups.
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1 . C cm man ding Qiiicer and Execut ive Officer
The function of the Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Ccmmand is to advise the Commanding Officer on the
"Formulation and implementation of policies concerning
morale, welfare, job satisfaction, discipline, utilization,
and training of Nave's men and women." This implies that
the Commanding Officer wants to be kept informed cf matters
that affect the enlisted personnel so that he can correct
any wrongs, resolve any inconsistancies, or decide en ether
appropriate actions to improve morale so that he can build a
cohesive working team that is willing to tackle shiptoard
problems- The Commanding Officer is willing to give up the
obvious talent of the Master Chief in his "in-rate" billet
in order to facilitate the supervision of the care and well-
being cf the enlisted personnel- The Commanding Officer is
also apparently not willing to have his chain of command use
their time in attending to these matters. Also, while the
Commanding Officer irdicates that he has the capability to
resolve personnel matters, when advised of them, he is
simultaneously implying that these problems can not be
resolved at lower levels. By using the Master Chief Petty
Officer cf the Command as a conduit, the Commanding Officer
implies that the individual sailors are not capable of exer-
cising appropriate self-assertiveness and self-
responsibility to resolve problems in thier own behalf- The
Commanding Officer dees not have a "Command Ensign" to
facilitate the problems of the "ensign community". Why?
The "ersign community" is expected to have enough maturity
and self-deter minaticn to represent themselves in matters of
personal concern- Whj not the enlisted community?
The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Ccmmand
program places the Commanding Officer sguarely in the
pattern cf the human relations model of management- The
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Master Chief Petty Cfficei of the Command is a tool to
assist the Commanding Officer in seeing to the needs of the
enlisted community sc that they will be cooperative with the
formal authority of the chain of command. The Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command represents the Ccmmanding
Officer's (and Navy's) paternalistic attitude towards the
enlisted ccamunity.
2- Mas ter Chief Petty Officer of the C omman d
A Navy Master Chief has served in the Navy for
twentj-plus years- He has demonstrated the highest level of
technical competence and significant anility to manage a
workcenter, a division, and maybe a department. Is the
Master Chief capable of exercising even more creative,
responsible self-direction and self-control than this
present in-rate job demands? If he is, what should the Navy
do to "untap" his additional potential? The human resource
model suggests that the managers basic task is to make use
fo the "untapped" resources. The human relations model
suggests that management should make him feel useful and
important and enable him to exercise self-control en routine
matters.
Ihe human resource model suggests that the Master
Chief should continue to broaden his self-direction and
self -ccntrol. If the Master Chief has successfully run a
workcenter for a long period and is obviously capable of
further contributions, why net make him a division officer?
Allow the Master Chief to be more creative than he has been
in the past. If the Master Chief has run a division for
several years, why net let him run the department if he has
the capability? There are numerous ways to expand the self-
deter nination and self-control of the Master Chief. Ihe
Master Chief cculd become a Limited Duty Officer to
facilitate even rroader expansion.
£5
The human relations model suggests that the Master
Chief shculd be mad-e to "feel" more useful and more impor-
tant. He should be informed and able to voice objections.
The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program gees
to great length to demonstrate the "importance" of the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. However, the
Master Chief's self direction and control have net been
broadened. He is net "responsible" for any more resources
or given discretionary license on fiscal matters- lhe
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is allowed to
communicate at a higher level of management. lhe Master
Chief Petty Officer cf the Command is used by the Commanding
Officer as a symbolic statement of Commanding Officer
concern for the enlisted community but that does not reguire
the Master Chief to fully use his resources or potential.
Indeed, much of the activity surrounding the Master Chief
Petty Officer cf the Command program reduces him to a
lackey. lhe Master Chief Petty Officer of the Ccmmand
program uses the Master Chief to address the issue of
enlisted usefulness and importance.
3- Chief Petty Cfficer s
lhe effect on the Chief Petty Officer community is
very similar to that of the remainder of the enlisted commu-
nity so the author will attempt only to highlight special
considerations in this section. The Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Coimand program does not increase the
creative, responsible self-direction and control cf the
Chief Petty Officers. It dees provide the Chief Petty
Cfficers with an alternative communication route tc the
Commanding Officer which can be utilized when the Chief
Petty Officer finds the chain of command unresponsive tc his
(or his division's) needs. The Chiefs have an organiza-
tional structure in place to meet their needs. As mentioned
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in the Cc discussion / this may very well imply a statement
that the Chief is not capable of controlling his own fate
unless an organizaticial support system is in place.
**• Enl ist ed Pers onnel
lie origins of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program evolved from a concern for the enlisted
community. Was that concern based in the human resources
model or in the human relations model? Was Admiral Zumwalt
attempting to encourage the enlisted community's willing
cooperation by recognizing their usefulness and importance
or was he trying to encourage them to exercise more
creative, responsible self -direction and self-control than
their jots demanded? Does the sailor of today contribute
more of his "untapped" resources or is he simply more
willing to cooperate with management as a result of the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program? Dees the
Master Chief Pettj Officer of the Command provide
motivation? Do they feel important and useful?
Ihe enlisted community* s relation to the Master
Chief Petty Officer of the Command clearly indicates that
the program is tased on the assumptions of the human rela-
tions model. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
is not tasked to participate in the task assignments which
determine the extent to which individual sailors can make
use of their "untapped" resources. Division Chiefs and
Officers provide the challenge of organizational objectives
and determine how much self-direction and control each man
can exercise. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
is involved with making people feel useful and important.
Ihe chain of command actually allows them to be useful and
important.
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5 . Junior Officers
At first glarce, it may seem somewhat strange to
address the question cf how the Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Ccmmand program effects the motivation of the junior
officers, hut juricr officers want to feel useful and impor-
tant and they want tc contribute to the organization in a
creative and responsible way. These are issues which
involve the organization's attitudes toward human relations
and human resources and since the Master Chief Petty Officer
cf the Ccmmand program is a visible indication of the orga-
nizational attitude tcward these issues, the junior officers
are affected.
If the junior officer is regarded as a manager, his
primary task is to make use of the human resources assigned
to his responsibilities. In order for the junior officer to
accomplish this, he must create an environment in which all
members contribute their best efforts. He can accomplish
this encouraging full participation in important matters,
creating good communications, and assisting the individuals
to exercise their potential in a relatively low-risk envi-
ronment. Ihe junior officer must demonstrate his recogni-
tion cf their independence as human beings and his
willingness to work with them on a one-to-one basis. With
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program high-
lighting a difference between the officer and enlisted
community, not just in billet description, but in a tone of
"us vs them", the junior officer will find the establishment
of the relationship mere difficult.
The junior officer may interpret the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command program in the manner referred
to in the discussion en delegation. The Commanding Officer
expresses doubt that the chain cf command will correctly see
to the enlisted matters. He, therefore, has a "supervisor"
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overlooking the execution of personnel matters. The
Commanding Officer is not willing to allow the junior





In the proceeding four chatters the author has presented
a critical analysis of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program as it affects the organization from four
perspectives or frames.
In the struc tura l perspective, the author demonstrated
how the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program,
in effect recentralized routine personnel matters iron the
lower and mid-level managers of the chain of command to the
Commanding Officer and Executive Officer. The program also
had the effect of changing the organization (in degree) from
a divisional structure to a functional structure. As an
example, the authcr argued that divisional structure
requires that management have control of and responsibility
for all assets used in attaining organizational goals, tut
that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command effec-
tively became the functional manager for enlisted personnel
matters. In a closely related argument, the author demon-
strated that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
program had the effect of organizationally resolving the
"dual leadership" conflict inherent in many decisions which
managers must make. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command provides for the social or people-oriented require-
ments of the organization while the traditional chain of
command provides for the task requirements.
In the political perspective, the importance of mana-
gerial power was discussed. The sources of basis of power
were listed and discussed. The author evaluated the Master
Chief Petty Officer of tne Command program's impact on five
interest groups* power.
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C cm in anding Officers appear to broaden their power base
through alliance with Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command, and increased reward activity independent cf the
chain cf command- lie Commanding Officer's position as the
crew's "representative" is enhanced because the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command demonstrates that the
Commanding Officer is "in touch" with the crew. The
Commanding Officer gains additional power by having access
to additional decision premises through the Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Command line of communications.
finally, the Ccmmanding Officer reduces his dependency on
the traditional chain of command because he now has another
avenue for the conduct of matters relating to the enlisted
community.
The power shift in favor of the Master Chief Petty
Officer cf the Command is the most significant political
effect of the program. The Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Command gains ability to influence others because cf his
alliance with the Commanding Officer. This alliance
provides the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command with
the ability to reward or punish, disseminate information
(decision premises) , and gain easy access to the Commanding
Officer or Executive Officer.
The author demonstrated that the representative power
enjoyed by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command may
be inappropriately bestowed. Results of the NAVSURFLANT
survey revealed that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command is more representative of, or has more in common
with, the Commanding Officer than he does with junior
enlisted personnel. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command's legitimate power base extends beyond the confines
of the command via the sguadrcn, group, and force master
chief crganiza tion.
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Chief Petty Officers gained power by having an
"in-hcuse" conduit to the Commanding Officer. The Chief
Petty Officer dependence for information on the junicr offi-
cers was reduced. Tie Chief Petty Officers have the ability
to recoimend rewards and punishments independent of the
junicr officers. The Chief Petty Officers even hav€ the
anility tc threaten the junicr officers with the use of
their "alternative" communications route. While high-
lighting several areas in which the Cnief Petty Officers are
less dependent en the chain of command, the author also
points out that they are now dependent in several ways on
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. While their
power tasis has teen troadened with junior officers, their
power has teen decreased in their relationship with the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command because of their
increased dependency en him.
The author demonstrated that power basis of the enlisted
personnel was essentially unchanged. The major advantage
for the enlisted personnel below the rank of chief, is an
increased access to decision premises. The author acknowl-
edged an improved oveiall situation for the enlisted commu-
nity but in terms of hygiene or relationship factors and not
increased power to determine one's own usefulness within the
organi2aticn.
Junicr officers were described as the major "losers" of
power as a result of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command represents an alternative conduit for matters
affecting individuals and the organization for the enlisted
community. This availability reduces their dependence on
the traditional chain of command. The junior officer's
coercive power is reduced to the extent that his subordi-
nates can use the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
communications link to convey their perception of the
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"fairness" of the junior officers' withholding of rewards or
use of punishment. Whether justified or not, the junior
officer will be placed in a defensive position when
inquiries start coming down the chain of command from the
Ccmmarding Officer.
The junior officer has lost some of his power base
related to decision premises. The chiefs and other enlisted
personnel can often obtain fetter and quicker information
from the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command than from
the chain of command. The author pointed out that it is not
unusual for the junicr officer to obtain information fiom
the chief that the junior officer ought to be providing to
the chief.
In the sym bolic perspective, the author summarized
several theories on symbology and demonstrated how symbolic
activities, language, ceremonies and other aspects of the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program can be
interpreted as different "statements" about the pcwer,
structure, and human resource attitudes of the Commanding
Officer and the Navy. The main focus of the discussion was
on the difference between how the Navy "says" the program
affects the chain of command and how the author "sees" the
program affecting the command. The MCPOC pin, office space,
access to the Commanding Officer all suggest that the Master
Chief Petty Officer of the Command has a significantly
higher status than do the junior officers.
In the human reso urces perspective, the author demon-
strates how the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
program effectively places the Navy in the business of human
relations management rather than the preferred human
resource management. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command serves the purpose of "caring" for the enlisted
community which the author believes represents a paternal-
istic attitude. The author believes that under a true human
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resource management organization, each and every manager
would re aware of tie potential of the individuals within
his organization and that mutual respect would enarle each
mature individual (enlisted and officer) to supervise his
own well-being. Thus, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program would not be necessary except under the most
unusual circumstances.
E. BICCflHIMDATIOHS
lie following recommendations are provided based on the
results cf the research as presented herein.
1. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program
should continue to be a viable line of communications
for extraordinary circumstances where the chain cf
command might not adequately support the best inter-
ests of the Navy's enlisted community.
2. Commanding Officers and Executive Officers should be
advised of the possible negative aspects cf the
program on tte various interest groups. In partic-
ular, the " Official " position as stated in
GOAVINST 5400. 37C , that the Master Chief Fetty
Officer of the Command works within the chain cf
command should be recognized as an idealistic state-
ment and not indicative of the real structural impact
of the progran. As long as the Commanding Officers
and other senior officers are willing to recognize
and adjust for this aspect of the program, the like-
lihood of significant organizational prctlems
resulting will be significantly reduced.
3. Ihe Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command should
be a collateral duty in all except the largest units
( coiplement of 1000 or more ) . This will guarantee
that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
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does not become too distant from the junior enlisted
personnel to lcse touch with the day-to-day consider-
ations and ccncerns of thrs group. The collateral
duty Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command should
net represent the same threat to the chain of command
that the full time Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command does. The chain of command will not feel
that a second chain is " waiting in the wings " for
the opportunity to challenge the chain of command.
4. The necessity to balance the needs of the service
with the needs of the indiviual service members
should be re-emphasized as the primary task of the
managers of the Navy at all levels. This task is not
to be left to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command or the Commanding Officer. It should occur at
tie leading petty officer, chief petty officer, and
junior officer levels as well as at the Commanding
Officer and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
level. It is the author's belief that this is the
real issue involved with the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command program and that the only way
the Navy is going to make maximum use of the human
resources available is to have the managers address
tie issue everyday in every decision. The Master
Chief Petty Officer ' of the Command program does not
force the chain of command to face this issue;instead
it allows the chain of command to pass ownership of
the problem to a special staff "action officer".
5, Ihe practice of having the Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Command participate in the ceremonies of the
command should be significantly reduced. This prac-
tice is particularly dangerous when the ceremony
involves the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command participating in ceremonies with the
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Commanding Officer cr ether senior officials. The
pewer implications are obvious and potentially disas-
terous. The Host important of these ceremonies are
those which involve direct participation of tie chain
of cemmand. Inspections make an excellent example in
that the chain of command is presenting their spaces
or personnel in order to be evaluated by seniors. If
the Waster Chief Petty Officer of the Command is a
key participant in the event, the chain cf command
participants lose the focus of responsiblity and
authority.
6- While not directly related to the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command program or this study, the
authcr believes that the survey results point to a
significant problem which should be investigated. Ihe
junior officer community as depicted by the survey
results is the least positive of any of the groups
evaluated. While the author does not presume to imply
that this situation is a direct result of the Master
Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, the
authcr does feel that the program may be one contrib-
utor to an overall problem area which can not be
ignored without significant consequences. The author
recommends that a review of the policies and atti-
tudes toward the junior officer community in SURFLANT
be initiated.
7. The final recommendation is a direct result cf the
interviews with Commanding Officers and other senior
officers. The majority of the Commanding Officers
expressed the desire to select their own Master Chief
Petty Officer cf the Command. They almost unanimously
relieved that the success of the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command would be determined to a large
degree by the personal relationship between the
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Commanding Officer and Master Chief Petty Officer of
tie Command. The Commanding Officers felt that ttey
cculd best decide who and in what billet the Master
Chief Petty Officer of the Command could serve the
test interests of the command.
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APPENDIX A
EXCERPT FROM CPNAVINSI 5400. 37C
SECTICN C - AOTHCRIH AND RESPONSIBILITIES .
1. As senior enlisted advisor to the commander/
commanding officer en ail matters relating to enlisted
policy, the Fleet, force, and Command Master Chiefs must
work with the executive officer, chief of staff, or deputy
in the dissemination and promotion of command policy. He or
she will function as an integral element of chain of
command.
2. Authority and Responsibility. Extent of role and ulti-
mate assignment of responsibilities and authority of Fleet,
Force, and Command Waster Chiefs will he determined by the
commander/commanding officer based on needs of the command.
In general, the following responsibilities will be included.
a. Maintain and promote effectiveness and efficiency of
chain of command.
b. Assist commander/commanding officer in all matters
pertaining to welfare, health, job satisfaction, morale,
utilization, and training of enlisted personnel in order
to promote traditional standards of good order and
discipline.
c. Advises commander/commanding officer on formulation
and implementation of changes in policy pertaining to
enlisted members.
d. Attend meetings as directed by commander/commanding
officer to keep apprised of current issues and provide a
representative enlisted input.
e. Participate in ceremonies honoring command members.
f
.
fihen appropriate, represent or accompany commander/
commanding officer to official functions, inspections,
and conferences.
g. Participate in reception and hosting of official
visitors to the command.
h. Upon invitation and as approved by commander/
commanding officer, represent the command and Navy at
community and civic functions.
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i. Participate in, coordinate, or monitor the
fcllcwirg, as appropriate.
1) Command Crient ation/Indoctrination
2) CPO/PO Indoctrination Courses
3) Enlisted Warfare Qualification Program
4) Professional Development Board
5) Command Retention Team
6) Awards Eoard (when enlisted personnel are teing
considered)




8) Human Resources Management Program
9) Family Services Programs; e.g.,
Family Services Centers
10) Onacconfanied Enlisted Personnel
Management Program
11) Haritarility Afloat Program
12) Commissary and Navy Exchange Advisory Beards
(Ashore)
13) General Mess and Ship's Store Advisory Beards
(Afloat)
14) Humanitarian Reassignment/Hardship Discharge
Screening Boards
15) Command Examining Boards
16) Recreation Advisory Boards
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3. The following F a/Cs, assigned as members of the Chief
of Naval Operations' Master Chief Petty Officer Advisory
Panel, will meet when directed by CNO. The Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Navy will chair the Advisory Panel.
Master Chief Pettv Officer of the Navy (ChairmarJ


















a. Fleet Master Chiefs shall take precendence ever all
ether enlisted members of ELS. Navy except Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Navy.
b. force Master Chiefs shall take precedence ever all
ether enlisted members of U.S. Navy except Master Chief
Petty Officer of the Navy and Fleet Master Chiefs.
c. Command Master Chief takes precedence over all ctier





Ine Master Chief fetty Officer of the Command program is
a significant step in the right direction. I thick it
should re expanded. Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Commands should he advanced to an "E-10" rate, given extra
priveleges, more pay, and more recognition. The program
helps to get the Master Chiefs back to sea where they are
needed. It helps keep them in the Navy when they otherwise
would have retired. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command aboard my last command provided me with the pulse of
the ship and served as a sounding board for my ideas. He
ran the Chief * s Mess in every sense of the word. The Chiefs
knew that he spoke for me. The Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Command ran NJP review, PO indoctrination, junior
officer training, awards, retention, and the Welcome Ahoard
program, and much more. I gave him an officer's stateroom,
fie can net do enough for these guys.
102
Captain, Sguadron Comaander
The Master Chief fetty Officer of the Command serves as
an additional conduit for the enlisted personnel. The
program is as good as the relationship between the
Commanding Officer ard the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command. The Commanding Officer should have the flexibility
to choose who he wants to be the Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Command. It shouldn't necessarily be determined
strictly by seniority. He can be used to handle programs
which affect the enlisted personnel but are not really the
responsibility of a particular department, for example, the
Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist program and I-divisicn.
There could be some resentment by tne chain of command if
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command gets "into
their krickers" but that shouldn't happen if the Commanding
Officer sets the right tone. The Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Command should be assigned on a collateral-duty
basis. A Master Chief has too much expertise in his rate to
simply ignore that aspect. If the program were cancelled
today, I don't think anything would change aboard good
ships. The Commanding Officer would still talk to "the
best" chief on board to try to .keep in touch with the
enlisted perspective.
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lieutenant, LDQ, (18 years service)
lie flaster Chief Petty Officer of the Command is just
one of aany of the "touch y-feely" programs which the Navy
has tried to use instead of returning to the basics. Most
of these programs shouldn't be there or should be signifi-
cantly scaled down. I was brought up with the basics. By
that, 1 mean the basics of leadership. My Chief kicked me
in the butt when I wasn't doing my job. He also went nose-
to-nose kith my division officer to get my leave approved
when I deserved it. He did net do it because he was aware
of my needs or because he was worried about retention. He
did what he did because he wanted to do a good job as the
chief and recause he was absolutely fair. Giving people
titles and phoney responsibilites doesn't do anything except
waste manpower. The best thing that the Master Chief Petty
Officer of the Command program does is that it tells people
that the Commanding Officer is, at least officially, inter-
ested in their problems. But, that really doesn't "do"
anything for people. If the Commanding Officer really wants
to "do" something for his troops, he tells the Executive
Officer and somewhere down the line (chain of command) seme
petty officer tells seme seaman to paint the berthing space
or fix the plumbing. In a majority of the cases I've seen,
the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command doesn't do
anything for the crew. Within three months of a Commanding
Officer's arrival, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command will be doing whatever the Commanding Officer wants,
not necessarily what the enlisted community needs. Ihe
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command becomes a "yes
man". At least if a Master Chief is running a division, he
can tell the Commanding Officer what's really happening and
then retreat to his wcrkcenter. If the Commanding Officer
really cares about tie troops, he'll tell that Master Chief
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to turn-to instead cf putting all the work on the good
chiefs that are being driven into the dirt.
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Chief Warrant Officer, (18 years)
Tie Master Chief Eetty Officer of the Command is one of
the best things to happen since I've been in the Navy. Ihe
Captain can get the story on what's really happening without
all the filters or blocks that usually get in the way. I
think the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command can make
the difference between having a good ship and a great ship.
If he works with the chain of command he will be listened to
and respected. The junior officers especially can get good
recommendations and guidance if they are willing to listen.
If the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command isn't the
type that puts the division officers on report to the
Commanding Officer/Executive Officer, he can really make a
difference. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
we have is a terrific chief and a great technician. I think
he gains a lot of respect because he is still dcing his
in-rate work even though the Captain wants to make him a
full time Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command- Of
course, he's so good that his division runs great even when
he's busy with command business. That helps here but on
ether ships the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command




lie major task of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command is to be the president of the CPO Mess. He can
really help the Commanding Cf ficer/Executive Officer keep
those guys integrally involved in running the ship. If he
can kee^. the Chiefs working with the Captain instead of
against him, the ship will be a superstar in every respect.
The Chiefs will keep the troops .busy and happy and free the
officers to keep up en the paperwork and warfare aspects.
The success of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
is going to be dependent a great deal on his personality and
the personality of the Commanding Officer/Executive Officer.
The Commanding Officer has to have someone with whom he can
work. The most senior chief may not be the best man tc fill
the billet. The Coaaanding Officer should have the flexi-
bility to pick and choose. The major attribute which the
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command ought to have is
some ability as a facilitator. If he has this ability, he
can communicate the problems he hears from the troops and
the pclicy or explaration he receives from the Commanding
Officer without challenging the Captain's authority or
siding with the establishment in the eyes of the crew.
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Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command,
(collateral duty)
I think the program has been a real success. The stan-
dards ha?e really improved in areas like habitability and
recreation and I thirk the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program has played an important part in it. Ihe
recent emphasis to get the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command more visibility is good. It shows the troops that
the enlisted community is an important part of the Navy and
that the Commanding Officer recognizes that fact. It is
very important that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command work within tie chain of command. If he is always
running to the Executive Officer to tell on this division
officer or department head, or even another chief, the word
is going to get around and people will steer clear of him.
I try to go to the lowest level I can to resolve problems.
I usually start with the Leading Petty Officer but sometimes
it's a matter of getting two seamen to talk to each other.
Ihe chiefs decided to make a real effort to get the petty
officers tc carry more of the load around here. As
President of the CPO Mess, I discussed it with the
Commanding Officer ard got his approval on the idea. Ihe
officers were behind us, too, especially since the
Commanding Officer wanted them to be behind us. I'm not
saying that we back-dcored them either. The officers would
have wanted to support us anyway but knowing that the
Commanding Officer was not going to come down on them if
something fell through the cracks made it a little easier
for them to take the risk of letting the Petty officers take
en mere responsibilities. This happened about four month's
ago and I think we've got seme young petty officers who are
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tetter qualified and more productive than a lot of chiefs on
ether ships. It happened .because everyone supported the
idea. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has




The idea behind the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program is gccd. I think it evolved from the Senior
Enlisted Advisor program of the early 1970' s. We really
needed it hack then because of the Viet Nam stuff, the prob-
lems with race relations, and the general unrest in the
junior enlisted ranks. I truthfully think the reason the
program is getting sc big is because we're using it as a
"carrot" to entice these guys to go back to sea. I don't
have anything to base that on; it's just a gut feeling. Xhe
thing I like about the Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command program is that it is another tool for the
Commanding Cfficer to use to help run his ship. If every-
thing is running smooth, then the Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Command can stay down in the holes (or wherever) and
take care ox his division responsibilities. If there* s a
problem somewhere that he can provide some information en,
the Captain can call him up or he can just come in and see
me. Ee has an open-door policy with me. I use him as a
sounding beard. He's been arcund a long time and he's seen
lots cf CO's make mistakes so maybe he can keep me from
tripping over my sword. The Commanding Officer should have
the flexibility to choose someone besides the most senior
chief. The guy who is most senior may not have the person-
ality to be a good Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
or he nay be too loaded down with division responsibilities.
I think the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command should
be a ccllateral duty except maybe on an aircraft carrier or
1HA. It's a nice asset but only as an extra benefit. I
don't think I'd want cne on a full time basis. If you asked
any Ccmmanding Officer if he'd rather spend his optar to pay
for a full time Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command or
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save the optar and assign his own collateral duty Master
Chief Fetty Officer of the Command, I think they'd all pick
the collateral duties. Of course, if Washington is giving
away Master Chiefs, no ones going to turn them down. If
nothing €lse, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
can take some of the load off the Executive Officer in the
routine personnel program areas.
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APPENDIX C
SOBVEY CI COMNAvSUBFLANT PEBSONNEL
THE PUEPCSE OF THIS SCBVEY IS TO GAIN AN UNDERSTANDING
CF THE NCEiAL MANNER CF CONDUCTING BUSINESS ABOARD YCUR
SHIP AND YOUR GENEBAI ATTITUDE REGARDING THE NORMS.
YOUB ANSWERS ARE ABSCIUTELY CONFIDENTIAL. THE COMPILED
DATA EECM AEOUT 30 COMMANDS WIIL BE PRESENTED TO
COMNA?SUBFI5NT AND SUIERINT ENBENT, NAVPGSCHOOL AS A
PORTION CF MY THESIS WORK. YOUR COOPERATION AND ASSIST-
ANCE ABE GEEATLY APPRECIATED.
PLEASE EILL IN THE BIANKS OB CIRCLE THE MULTIPLE-CHOICE
ANSWER WfcERE APPROPRIATE.
ALL BANDS
1. What is your present rank/rate?_










3. How many years have you been on active duty in the
USN?
4. How many years have you spent aboard SURFLANT
Conmands?
5. Not including your present command, to how many
SORFLANT commands have you been assigned?
6. While considering the merits or" a Captain's Mast (NJP)
,
which person do ycu feel would best be able to influence







7. If a junior enlisted man experienced raciai/ethcic dis-
crimination from his division chief and wanted to prevent
further discrimination without causing future reper-
cussions/animosities, to whcm would he most likely






8- If you were the Executive Officer of a ship and wanted
to obtain a feel fcr the probable reaction of the crew
regarding a possible policy change, from whom would
ycu most liJcely seek advice?
a. A department Head
b. A leading petty officer
c. Ccmmand Chief
d. A division CPC
e. Chaplain
9- Hhich of the following individuals in your opinion is
most likely to understand the values, social pressures,








10. If a Task Force Commander (Rear Admiral/Commodore) came
atcaxd your ship and asked to receive four briefs regard-
ing the status of your ship, who could best provide tie









11. During routine inport operations at what time of day
(en a 24 hour clock) do you usually arrive on hoard?
12. Durirg routine inport operations at what time of day
(en a 24 hour clock) do you usually depart the ship for
tie cay?
13. In hew Jiany sectiens are you personally standing duty?
a. Ihree or less
t. Jour
c. Five
d. Six or mere
e. I am not assigned to stand duty days.
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14. Jihici of the personnel listed below, if any, do you feel
should not be required to stand duty? {Circle each
category that you feel should be exempted)
a. CO
t. 1C






i- Surface Warfare Officers
j. Chief Petty Officers
X. Command Chief
1. Supply Corps Officers
o. Ship*s Secretary
15. 1c what extent are appropriate and reasonable privi-
ledges commensurate with responsibility and position
granted to the Chief Petty Officers of this command?
a. Significantly insufficient privileges are granted
£.« Somewhat insufficient privileges are granted
c. Privileges are appropriate and reasonable
d. Somewhat excessive privileges are granted
e. Significantly excessive privileges are granted
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16- lo what extent are appropriate and reasonable privileges
commensurate with responsibility and position granted to
tie junior officers of this command?
a. Significantly insufficient privileges are granted
r. Somewhat insufficient privileges are granted
c. Privileges are appropriate and reasonable
d. Somewhat excessive privileges are granted
e. Significantly excessive privileges are granted
17. 1c what extent are appropriate and reasonable privileges,
commensurate with responsibilities and position, granted
tc the Command Chief of this command?
a. Significantly insufficient privileges are granted
t. Somewhat insufficiert privileges are granted
c. Privileges are appropriate and reasonable
d. Somewhat excessive privileges are granted
e. Significantly excessive privileges are granted
18. 3c what extent is earning a battle efficiency "E"
important to you?
a. lo a very great extent
t. To a great extent
c. lo somewhat of an extent
d. lo a small extent
e. lo a very small extent
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19. 3c what extent do you feel that the job you are £er form-
ing is wortnwhile?
a, To a very great extent
r. To a great extent
c. To somewhat of an extent
d. To a small extent
e. To a very small extent
20. Cn the average, to what extent do you enjoy coming to
wcrk in the morning?
a. To a very great extent
t. To a great extent
c. To somewhat of an extent
d. To a small extent
e. To a very small extent
21. Cn the average, tc what extent do you feel that ycur time
is used productively during the working day?
a. To a very great extent
£. To a great extent
c. To somewhat of an extent
d. To a small extent
€. To a very small extent
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22. On the average, tc what extent do your superiors enforce
the use of the chain of command?
a. lo a very great extent
t. lo a great extent
c. lo somewhat oi an extent
d. lo a small extent
e. lo a very small extent
23. Cn the average, tc what extent is your chain of command
willing to take action on known or alleged racial cr
ethnic issues?
a. lo a very great extent
1- lo a great extent
c. lo somewhat of an extent
d. lo a small extent
e. lo a very small extent
OFFICERS ANI CHIEF PE1TY OFFICERS PLEASE CONTINUE ON NEXT
PAGE. All C1HERS PLEASE STOP AND RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE
10 THE PBOClOfi. 1HANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME ANE COOPERATION.
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CPO/OIEICEBS
24. During a normal inport work-week, on the average
how many hours dc ^cu spend talking with the
Executive Officer on a one to one basis?
25. Hew do you feel about the amount of time you spend with
the Executive Officer?
a. Consider it t c te very insufficient
b. Consider it tc be somewhat insufficient
Co Consider it tc be appropriate
d. Consider it tc be somewhat excessive
e- Consider it tc te very excessive
26. During a normal inport work-week, on the average
hew nary hours dc you spend talking
with the Captain on a one to one basis?
,_,
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27. Hew do you feel about the amount of time you spend
with the Captain?
A. Consider it tc be very insufficient
E. Consider it tc be somewhat insufficient
C- Consider it tc be appropriate
D. Consider it tc be somewhat excessive
E. Ccnsider it tc be very excessive
28. Which of the following best describes the tone of ycur
relationship with the Captain? (If none applies, please
choose the answer which is least inaccurate.)
a. Businesslike lased on mutual respect
b. friendly and positive
c. He uses me to implement his policies
d. H€ dees net appreciate my ability and potential
e. He shows interest in my well-being only to the extent
that he feels he must.
29. Which of the following best describes the tone of
ycur relationship with the Executive Officer?
(If rone applies, please choose the answer which
is the least inaccurate.)
a. Businesslike based on mutual respect
b. Friendly and pesitive
c. He uses me to implement his policies
d. He dees not appreciate my ability and potential
e. He shows interest in my well-being only to the extent
that he feels he must
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30. Which of the following rest describes the dominant
motivation which jursuaded you to join the Navy?
a. I saw an opportunity to obtain training and education
which otherwise would net have been available to me.
b. I saw an opportunity to travel and be "on my cwn".
c. I wanted to serve my country
d. I saw an opportunity to become a leader with significant
responsibility at an early age.
e. I saw an opportunity to earn a reasonable income with
security and I did not have any better options at the time
31. 1c what extent do you feel that the word received in
the CFO mess is mere accurate than the word received
via tte chain of command?
a. lo a very great extent
t. lo a great extent
c. lo some extent
d. lo a little extent
e. lo a very little extent
;2. 1c what extent have you been given the opportunity to
learn and demonstrate management and leadership com-
mensurate with your ability?
a. lo a very great extent
b. lo a great extent
c. lo some extent
d. lo a little extent
e. lo a very little extent
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33- To what extent is the management/leadership aspect cf
your jot mere important to you than the warfare/
technical aspect?
a. lo a very great extent
b. lo a great extent
c. To some extent
d„ lo a little extent
e- lo a very little extent
34. lo what extent does your job performance reflect your
maximum capability?
a. lo a very great extent
t. lo a great extent
c. lo some extent
d- lo a little extent
e- lo a very little extent
35. 1c what extent ar€ your special achievements or extra
efforts recognized by the CO?
a. lo a very great extent
t. lo a great extent
c m lo some extent
d. lo a little extent
e. lo a very little extent
123
36. lo what extent have you teen given the authority and
responsibility ccamensurate with your billet?
a. lo a very great extent
t- lo a great extent
c- lo some extent
d. lo a little extent
e. lo a very little extent
37. 1c what extent are you confident that the CO would act
en a worthwhile suggestion by you?
a. lo a very great extent
r . lo a great extent
c. lo some extent
d- lo a little extent
e. lo a very little extent
38. lo what extent dc you feel that the CO has an accurate
understanding of your mctivations?
a. lo a very great extent
r. lo a great extent
c. lo some extent
d. lo a little extent
e. lo a very little extent
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39- To what extent dc you feel that the CO has a genuine
concern for your welfare?
a- lo a very great extent
t. lo a great extent
c. lo some extent
d- lo a little extent
e, lo a very little extent
40. To what extent dc you feel that privileges in the Navy
are granted appropriately?
a. lo a very great extent
h. lo a great extent
c. lo some extent
d. lo a little extent
e. lo a very little extent
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41. la what extent dc you agree with the practice of grant-
ing special privileges to personnel junior in rank to
perscns not granted these privileges (i.e. Sailor of the
Quarter/CPO/MCPO reserved parking places at the Navy
Exchange or pier parking lets, exemptionf rom
the watchbill, etc...)?
a. Strcngly agree with practice
t. Agree with practice
c« No opinion
d. Disagree with practice
e. Strcngly disagree with practice
COflMANI MASTER/SENIOR/CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS PLEASE CONTINUE ON
NEXT EAGI. ALL OTHERS PLEASE STOP AND RETURN QUESTIONNAIRE TO
PROCTCE. THANK YCU FCE YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION.
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COMMAND CHIEF
42. To what extent did your formal schools prepare ycu for
ycur present billet?
a. 1o a very great extent
t. lo a great extent
c. 1o some extent
d. lo a little extent
e- lo a very little extent
43. 1c whom (by billet, not name) are you directly
reversible for the manner in which you perform
ycur primary job?
44. Over the past four weeks, hew many hours have you spent
working/assisting in the area of your rate? (i.e. for a
GflCa, how many hcurs working with missile systems ci
assisting your cclImand , s GM's?)
a. None
b. Cne-half workday (4 hours) or less
c. Eetueen one-half and a full workday
d. The equivalent of one to three workdays
e. More than the equivalent of three workdays
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45. Thinking about your job when you were a division chief,
hew would you compare the relative satisfaction you
received then as compared to the satisfaction you
receive now?
a. Significantly more satisfaction as a division chief
t. Somewhat more satisfaction as a division chief
c. No definable difference
d. Somewhat more satisfaction as Command Chief
e. Significantly more satisfaction as a Command Chief
46. Since becoming a Command Chief, have you ever teen




47. Since becoming a Command Chief, have you ever discussed
the leadership/management problems of a specific division
officer or department head with the CO or XO?
a. Yes
b. No
48. Since becoming a Command Chief/ have you ever promulgated
a command- wide policy announcement (i.e. change in the
daily routine, procedures for mess cooks, etc...)?
a. Yes
b. No
PLEASI EiTUSN THE QO IS1ICNN AIRE TO THE PROCTOB. THANK YCU FOB
YOUR 1IMI AND COOPERA1I0N.
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APPENDIX D








CSS WAINWEIGHT (CG 28)
CSS JOSEPHCS DANIELS (CG 21)
DSS PEEELE (DDG 46)
CSS CONYINGHAM (DDG 17)
DSS EICHAED E. BYBD (DDG 23)
ISS KING (DDG 41)
CSS SAMISGN (DDG 10)
CSS THOEN (DD 988)
DSS MCCLOY (FF 1038)
CSS THOMAS C. HAET (FF 1092)
CSS MOINESIEB (FF 1097)
CSS EDWAED MCDONNEL (FF 1043)
DSS TBIfP (FF 1075)
CSS JOESEPH HEWES (FF 1078)
CSS BALIEGB (LPD 1)
CSS IWO JIMA (LPH 2)
CSS POBTLAND (LSD 37)
CSS SPAETENBOEG COUNTY (LST 1192)
CSS YELLOWSTONE (AD 41)
CSS SIEEEA (AD 18)
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